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GRAND JURY DISCRETION AND
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN
Roger A. Fairfax, Jr.†
The grand jury possesses an unqualified power to decline to indict—
despite probable cause that alleged criminal conduct has occurred.  A grand
jury might exercise this power, for example, to disagree with the wisdom of a
criminal law or its application to a particular defendant.  A grand jury
might also use its discretionary power to “send a message” of disapproval
regarding biased or unwise prosecutorial decisions or inefficient allocation of
law enforcement resources in the community.  This ability to exercise discre-
tion on bases beyond the sufficiency of the evidence has been characterized
pejoratively as “grand jury nullification.”  Grand jury nullification, like its
well-known cousin, petit jury nullification, is controversial.  The dominant
substantive critiques of grand jury nullification attack the grand jury’s dis-
cretion in this regard as bad criminal justice policy at best and subversive of
the rule of law at worst.  Any acknowledgement of the grand jury’s discretion-
ary power often is accompanied by  concerns regarding the damage that crit-
ics perceive it to levy upon the criminal process.  This Article argues that such
concerns largely are unfounded and derive from a fundamental misunder-
standing of the scope of the grand jury’s discretion and its function in the
constitutional structure.  The Article defends grand jury discretion against
the critique that it is necessarily inconsistent with the rule of law.  It contends
instead that grand jury discretion actually buttresses the rule of law by facili-
tating the grand jury’s structural role in the constitutional design as a check
on the three branches of government and as a moderator of criminal law
federalism.  In addition, the Article maps the spectrum of discretion that is
exercised by various actors throughout the criminal process and argues that
the grand jury’s discretionary power represents an appropriate, if not opti-
mal, allocation of that discretion.  Finally, the Article argues that grand jury
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discretion is desirable because it can enhance the administration of criminal
justice—not only from an individual rights perspective but also from crime
control and efficiency perspectives.  The Article concludes that the grand
jury’s robust discretionary role in the criminal justice process not only is con-
sistent with but also implements constitutional design.
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INTRODUCTION
A grand jury in northern California refuses to indict a community
activist for federal narcotics offenses even though the activist admitted
distributing free marijuana to AIDS patients at a local clinic.
A grand jury in the District of Columbia informs an Assistant
United States Attorney (AUSA) that it will not return an indictment in
any nonviolent drug offense case until the AUSA investigates a high-
ranking city official whom many community members believe to be
taking bribes from a large public works contractor.
A grand jury in Texas refuses to indict for past nonviolent prop-
erty crimes a twenty-five-year-old community college student who has
recently broken ties with his gang, made restitution, and turned his
life around.
A grand jury in Colorado refuses to indict a decorated Desert
Storm veteran for a firearms possession crime stemming from his use
of a banned, modified weapon during a family hunting trip.
Each of these hypothetical scenarios exemplifies the grand jury’s
power to exercise its discretion whether to indict on bases other than
sufficiency of the evidence.  These portrayals, in which a grand jury
moves beyond the function of determining whether probable cause
exists to proceed to trial, sit in stark contrast with the familiar percep-
tion of the modern grand jury—a body that, after passively receiving
from the prosecutor just enough evidence (usually in the form of un-
challenged hearsay testimony) to satisfy the probable cause threshold,
reflexively and without critical analysis votes to indict, just as the pros-
ecutor requested.1
This critique, which has enjoyed traction since Jeremy Bentham’s
early-nineteenth-century call for the abolition of the grand jury,2 views
the grand jury as a weak, passive, and, for some, unnecessary screen-
ing organ designed to determine simply whether probable cause exists
before a case proceeds to trial.  Although constitutional mandate and
the potent investigative power of the grand jury necessitate its contin-
ued existence, changes in substantive criminal law and in criminal
procedure have worked symbiotically over the past two-hundred years
to render the portrait of marginalization from which the grand jury
1 See, e.g., 1 SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:9 (2d ed.
2005); Niki Kuckes, The Useful, Dangerous Fiction of Grand Jury Independence, 41 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1, 2 (2004); Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Ac-
cused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 294–304 (1995) (arguing that lay grand jurors are ill-
equipped to make the legal conclusion that probable cause exists in a given case and there-
fore  will accept a prosecutor’s recommendation to indict).
2 See JEREMY BENTHAM, 1 RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 524 (1827); JEREMY BEN-
THAM, 2 THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 139–40 (John Bowring ed., 1843).
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suffers today.3  It is a self-fulfilling prophecy: the greater the percep-
tion that the grand jury does little to protect individual rights or to
improve the efficient administration of justice, the more society will
allow the institution to be marginalized.  And the underlying premise
of this negative perception is that the grand jury’s defining purpose is
to test the sufficiency of the evidence by determining whether proba-
ble cause exists.
To the contrary, the grand jury was never designed as a mere
sounding board to test the sufficiency of the evidence, nor is it limited
to that basic, albeit important, function today.  Where the grand jury
truly adds value is through its ability to exercise robust discretion not
to indict where probable cause nevertheless exists—what might be
termed “grand jury nullification.”4  Understandably, some may be
troubled by concerns that grand jury discretion undermines the rule
of law, is somehow unwarranted, or hinders the administration of jus-
tice—all arguments often lodged against petit jury nullification.  This
Article, however, contends that such concerns are misplaced in the
context of the grand jury.
Grand jury discretion not only is consistent with the rule of law,
but it buttresses the rule of law in significant ways by, inter alia, facili-
tating the grand jury’s hidden structural role within our constitutional
democracy.  Furthermore, the grand jury’s discretionary power is con-
sistent with an appropriate allocation of discretion among actors in
the criminal process.  Finally, from a normative standpoint, the grand
jury’s ability to exercise discretion on bases beyond sufficiency of the
evidence can actually contribute to the effective administration of the
criminal justice system—both enhancing crime control and protect-
ing individual rights.  Although the grand jury’s robust discretion is
not without its drawbacks and limitations, it is the defining character-
istic of a grand jury that fully performs its intended function in the
criminal justice system.
Part I of this Article unpacks the value-laden grand jury “nullifica-
tion” characterization and places in proper historical and analytical
context the grand jury’s power to exercise discretion not to indict de-
spite the existence of probable cause.  Questioning the definitional
judgments that underlie the concept of nullification, Part I grapples
with some of the major conceptual difficulties that confront a norma-
tive embrace of the grand jury’s discretion to consider factors beyond
3 See Ric Simmons, Re-Examining the Grand Jury: Is There Room for Democracy in the Crimi-
nal Justice System?, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1, 30–32 (2002).
4 Cf. Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification Within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1149,
1150 (1997) (defining “jury nullification” as “a jury’s ability to acquit a criminal defendant
despite finding facts that leave no reasonable doubt about violation of a criminal statute”).
As I discuss below, see infra note 10, the term “grand jury nullification” deserves careful R
definition and is more properly characterized as “grand jury discretion.”
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the sufficiency of the evidence, including the desires to ensure that
legitimate law enforcement is not frustrated and to minimize ignoble
motivations.  Part II argues that the grand jury’s robust discretion for-
tifies rather than subverts the rule of law and that it can function
wholly consistently with constitutional design.  Highlighting the signif-
icance of the grand jury’s discretion for the implementation of crimi-
nal law federalism and the separation and checking of powers in our
tripartite system of government, Part II also casts doubt on the rule-of-
law critique’s premise that the grand jury’s function is confined to
measuring sufficiency of the evidence.  In Part III, the Article maps
the vast discretion of the various decision makers in the criminal pro-
cess and argues that, given its history and purpose, the grand jury not
only deserves its robust discretion but is also uniquely equipped to
exercise such discretion.  Part IV describes the benefits of this robust
discretion and suggests that the grand jury’s ability to employ that dis-
cretion actually may enhance the administration of criminal justice,
including crime-control efforts.
I
CONTEXTUALIZING GRAND JURY DISCRETION
A. Defining and Identifying Grand Jury “Nullification”
The Fifth Amendment’s Grand Jury Clause mandates that “[n]o
person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury.”5  The
Constitution thus requires that the government obtain a grand jury’s
consent before prosecuting a capital or other felony offense.6  The
dominant modern conception is that such consent rests solely upon
5 U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Grand Jury Clause has not been incorporated to apply
to the states, which may choose to initiate felony criminal proceedings in other ways consis-
tent with the Due Process Clause. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 537 (1884).
Although this Article focuses primarily on the federal grand jury, it will periodically discuss
state grand juries, as the overwhelming majority of criminal law enforcement takes place at
the state level, see Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEXAS L. REV. 223,
260 n.184 (2007), and about half of the fifty states have some form of grand jury require-
ment. See 2 BEALE ET AL., supra note 1, § 8.2. R
6 The federal grand jury is a body of sixteen to twenty-three people, summonsed for
service in much the same way as petit jurors, and selected and empanelled with the partici-
pation of both a judge and the prosecutor. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6.  Sitting for eighteen
months or more, the grand jury typically hears evidence presented by the prosecutor in a
variety of cases, this evidence having been subpoenaed to the grand jury in the form of
testimony, documents, or physical evidence. See id.  The grand jury issues its consent in the
form of an indictment, which is a statement of charges against the accused. See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 7(c)(1) (“The indictment . . . must be a plain, concise, and definite written state-
ment of the essential facts constituting the offense charged . . . .”); 1 BEALE ET AL., supra
note 1, § 1.8. R
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the grand jury’s assessment of the sufficiency of the evidence.7  In
other words, the modern conception assumes that the grand jury
should indict if the government presents enough evidence to establish
probable cause that the accused committed the alleged crimes.8  In
this view, grand jury nullification occurs if the grand jury, despite re-
ceiving sufficient evidence to establish probable cause, “exercises its
own political, moral, and social judgment in reviewing the prosecu-
tor’s decision to bring the case”9 and declines to indict.10
Although the definition of grand jury nullification is relatively
straightforward, identifying when such nullification has occurred is
not nearly as clear.  Like attempts to identify petit jury nullification,
attempts to identify specific instances of grand jury nullification suffer
from the difficulty—if not impossibility—of determining whether a
particular decision was based on an impartial weighing of the evi-
dence or on some other ground.11  For example, in the petit jury con-
7 This dominant view assumes that the grand jury is performing a quasi-judicial func-
tion in passing upon probable cause. See Model Grand Jury Charge: Approved by the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States, March 2005, http://www.uscourts.gov/jury/
charge.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2008) [hereinafter Model Grand Jury Charge] (“The pur-
pose of the Grand Jury is to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify a
formal accusation against a person—that is, to determine if there is ‘probable cause’ to
believe the person committed a crime. . . .  [Y]ou should vote to indict where the evidence
presented to you is sufficiently strong to warrant a reasonable person’s belief that the per-
son being investigated is probably guilty of the offense charged.”).  In her insightful article,
Professor Niki Kuckes illuminates difficulties arising from the Supreme Court’s lack of
commitment to either a ‘judicial’ or ‘prosecutorial’ characterization of the grand jury’s
constitutional function and advances a resolution that casts the grand jury as a “democratic
prosecutor”—a vehicle for citizen participation within the prosecution function.  See Niki
Kuckes, The Democratic Prosecutor: Explaining the Constitutional Function of the Federal Grand
Jury, 94 GEO. L.J. 1265, 1300 (2006).
8 See, e.g., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, HANDBOOK FOR FEDERAL GRAND JURORS
3 (1999) (instructing grand jurors that if they “find[ ] probable cause to exist, then [they]
will return a written statement of the charges called an ‘indictment’”); AM. BAR ASS’N,
JUDICIAL ADMIN. SECTION, FEDERAL GRAND JURY HANDBOOK 8 (1958) (noting that an indict-
ment is “voted by the Grand Jury when evidence is found to sustain the charge”).
9 Simmons, supra note 3, at 46. R
10 The term “grand jury nullification” is somewhat of a misnomer because it assumes
that the grand jury’s discretion is confined to sufficiency of the evidence.  As is discussed
below, see infra subpart II.B, this is far too cramped a conception of the grand jury’s discre-
tionary role.  Also, the term has pejorative connotations, see Kuckes, supra note 7, at 1269, R
does not capture the essence of the enterprise of the grand jury’s exercise of discretion, cf.
David C. Brody, Sparf and Dougherty Revisited: Why the Court Should Instruct the Jury of Its
Nullification Right, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 89, 91 (1995), and unfairly yokes grand jury discre-
tion with petit jury nullification without careful consideration. See infra subpart I.C.  Ac-
cordingly, a more appropriate characterization than “grand jury nullification” is the grand
jury’s “exercise of robust discretion.”  This Article will use both characterizations to de-
scribe instances where the grand jury determines whether to indict on bases other than the
sufficiency of the evidence.
11 See, e.g., HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 429–33 (1966) (list-
ing nonevidentiary factors upon which petit juries rest decisions regarding whether to con-
vict or acquit, including the personal characteristics of the defendant, propriety of the
prosecutorial decision, and the wisdom of the law allegedly violated).
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text, one might suspect that nullification motivated a particular jury
verdict.12  Unless the petit jurors publicly and truthfully reveal their
reasons for acquitting, however, one cannot confirm that nullification
has occurred.13
Even if we agree that jury nullification occurs when a prosecutor
presents a jury with a quantum of unrebutted evidence sufficient to
satisfy the relevant standard of proof yet that jury fails to convict or
indict, who determines whether the evidence was sufficient?  The evi-
dence may overwhelmingly and credibly persuade the observer of a
trial that each element of a charged crime has been satisfied.  Cer-
tainly, such an observer would conclude that the jury has nullified un-
less it convicts.  The jury, however, might view the evidence through a
lens different from that of mere observers or active participants in the
trial.  Also, different juries may view the same evidence differently, as
might individual jurors on the same jury.  There is no absolute truth
with regard to sufficiency of the evidence.14  To be sure, courts some-
times second-guess (or first-guess) juries when assessing sufficiency of
the evidence on appeal or in the context of a motion for a judgment
of acquittal.  Most often, however, the task of these courts is simply to
opine what a reasonable or rational jury might have done.15  Thus,
12 See, e.g., id.
13 See NORMAN J. FINKEL, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS’ NOTIONS OF THE LAW 41–46
(1995).  One possible exception, of course, may include “public confession” cases in which
an individual violates a law publicly to protest a policy related to the law or the legitimacy
of the law itself.  One may reasonably identify jury nullification in jury acquittals in such
civil disobedience cases—such as Vietnam-era draft card burning in violation of federal
law—where there is no doubt (and often a confession) as to the violation of a criminal
statute. See, e.g., Lawrence W. Crispo et al., Jury Nullification: Law Versus Anarchy, 31 LOY.
L.A. L. REV. 1, 13–16 (1997) (discussing United States v. Moylan, 417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir.
1969)); David N. Dorfman & Chris K. Iijima, Fictions, Fault, and Forgiveness: Jury Nullification
in a New Context, 28 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 861, 876–77 (1995) (discussing Vietnam War
resister cases).  A context in which it may be less difficult to determine that a jury has relied
on non-evidentiary grounds is that of strict liability offenses where there is an admission by
the defendant.  For example, former New York magistrate judge Morris Ploscowe has sug-
gested that grand juries frequently refused to indict in statutory rape prosecutions involv-
ing young couples. See MORRIS PLOSCOWE, SEX AND THE LAW 178 (Ace Books 1962) (1951).
This pattern of grand jury forbearance presumably would hold even where the young de-
fendant publicly admits to the conduct violating the statute.
14 As one anonymous seventeenth-century pamphleteer noted on the subject of occa-
sions when public perception might differ from the grand jury’s assessment of the evi-
dence, “a man cannot see by another’s Eye, nor hear by another’s Ear; no more can a Man
conclude or infer things to be resolved, by another’s Understanding or Reasoning . . . .”
BARBARA J. SHAPIRO, “BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT” AND “PROBABLE CAUSE”: HISTORICAL PER-
SPECTIVES ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LAW OF EVIDENCE 66 (1991) (quoting a dialogue be-
tween “Indifference” and “Prejudice” in Ignoramus Vindicated).
15 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 326 (1979); Am. To-
bacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 787 n.4 (1946); see also Roger A. Fairfax, Jr.,
Harmless Constitutional Error and the Institutional Significance of the Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV.
2027 (2008) (discussing appellate harmless-error review of jury verdicts based upon consti-
tutionally flawed jury instructions).
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determining when jury nullification has taken place is an inexact sci-
ence at best.16
The stringent secrecy restrictions on grand jurors’ communica-
tions present and exacerbate the difficulties in identifying grand jury
nullification.17  Whereas petit jurors may expose the substance of jury
deliberations after trial, thus helping an assessment of whether petit
jurors nullified, grand jurors are forbidden, under penalty of con-
tempt, from disclosing any information about matters that occurred
before the grand jury—even after the grand jury has disbanded.18
Secrecy rules also impede public disclosure of the evidence—in-
culpatory or exculpatory—that a prosecutor presented to a grand
jury, thus frustrating an informed assessment of whether the grand
jury nullified.19  Grand jury secrecy requirements also shield the iden-
tity of grand jury witnesses.20  If one discovers that a particular witness
testified before the grand jury and that witness recounts the substance
of that witness’s testimony (as is that witness’s right21), the outside
observer has no way to assess the witness’s truthfulness or thorough-
ness of recollection.  Even where trial discovery obligations prompt
the disclosure of certain witnesses’ grand jury testimony transcripts,22
the cold record does not convey the witness’s appearance, manner-
isms, or other factors that would inform an attendant observer’s credi-
16 Further complicating the problem is the fact that juries may (and often do) reach
compromise verdicts, where inconsistencies in the verdict signal that the jury may have
disregarded evidence sufficient to satisfy one or more counts as a compromise to reach
agreement on conviction on other counts.  Often, this occurs when jurors seek to limit the
possible punishment to which the defendant might be exposed. See, e.g., Diane E. Cour-
selle, Struggling with Deliberative Secrecy, Jury Independence, and Jury Reform, 57 S.C. L. REV. 203,
220–21 (2005); Ethan J. Leib, Supermajoritarianism and the American Criminal Jury, 33 HAS-
TINGS CONST. L.Q. 141, 184–85 (2006).  A recent study demonstrates that some judges
might succumb to the same temptation, particularly given the constraints on their sentenc-
ing discretion. See Andrew D. Leipold, Why Are Federal Judges So Acquittal Prone?, 83 WASH.
U. L.Q. 151, 200–18 (2005) (evaluating the hypothesis that judges may acquit more fre-
quently when faced with having to impose severe sentences compelled by strict sentencing
guidelines regimes).
17 See Leipold, supra note 1, at 288. R
18 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2)(B)(i); United States v. Marcucci, 299 F.3d 1156, 1163
(9th Cir. 2002).
19 See Leipold, supra note 1, at 287–88, 310.  The prosecutor has the best sense of the R
scope of evidence that the grand jury received but is perhaps the least neutral assessor of
whether the grand jury has nullified.  Cf. id. at 275 (explaining that prosecutors are likely
to bring those cases where the prosecutor expects the grand jury will issue an indictment
and to decline to bring those cases that the grand jury will reject).
20 See AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 8, at 17. R
21 See Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624, 634–35 (1990) (finding a statute that pro-
hibited a grand jury witness from publicly recounting one’s own testimony to violate the
First Amendment).
22 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (2000); FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2; Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 86–87 (1963) (holding that the state violates a criminal defendant’s due process rights
when it suppresses information that is material and favorable to the defendant’s case).
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bility assessment.23  Also, the outside observer may not be aware of
testimony given by other witnesses, nor will such an observer know of
other evidence that the grand jury considered—documentary or phys-
ical—that contradicts a known witness’s testimony.
Furthermore, unlike those of the petit jury, grand jury instruc-
tions are largely shielded from the public view.  Although many grand
juries receive general instructions based on the Model Grand Jury
Charge,24 which is available for public review,25 the specific instruc-
tions that prosecutors give to specific grand juries are shrouded in
secrecy.26  Thus, a grand jury may decide not to indict based on incor-
rect or confusing instructions on the applicable law rather than on
disregard of the evidence.27
Attempts to identify instances of grand jury nullification inher-
ently involve a fair amount of uncertainty.  Even where the strength of
the evidence or the circumstances surrounding a case strongly indi-
cate that a grand jury has nullified by declining to indict, certainty is
fleeting.  Although it may seem unsatisfactory to rely on a “you know it
when you see it” approach in classifying a grand jury’s action as nullifi-
cation, a better metric is elusive.28
B. Categorizing Grand Jury “Nullification”
Even tolerating the uncertainty attendant to framing our notions
of when a grand jury has nullified, there remain the questions of why it
has nullified and what might such action attempt to achieve.  Some
23 See Chet K.W. Pager, Blind Justice, Colored Truths and the Veil of Ignorance, 41 WILLAM-
ETTE L. REV. 373, 375–77 (2005) (discussing the view that a witness’s demeanor may affect
a juror’s credibility assessment).
24 Cf. United States v. Marcucci, 299 F.3d 1156, 1163 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]e have no
indication that the standard charge generally has not been given to federal grand
juries . . . .”).
25 Model Grand Jury Charge, supra note 7. R
26 Indeed, it is difficult even for a defendant seeking to raise objections to a prosecu-
tor’s instructions to a grand jury to obtain a transcript. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(E)(ii)
(conditioning disclosure of grand jury matters upon a defendant’s showing that “a ground
may exist to dismiss the indictment because of a matter that occurred before the grand
jury”); id. 16(a)(3) (excluding grand jury transcripts from the discovery obligations im-
posed by this rule); Benjamin E. Rosenberg, A Proposed Addition to the Federal Rules of Crimi-
nal Procedure Requiring the Disclosure of the Prosecutor’s Legal Instructions to the Grand Jury, 38
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1443, 1448 (2001) (proposing a revision of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure to provide arraigned defendants with a transcript of the legal instructions given
to the grand jury).
27 See Leipold, supra note 1, at 288 n.142. R
28 Related to the question of when grand jury nullification has occurred is the ques-
tion of how often it occurs.  Although the factors mentioned above frustrate an accurate and
complete quantitative assessment, the existence of significant motive and opportunity for
the grand jury’s exercise of its robust discretion provides a basis for concluding that the
phenomenon occurs, even though there are barriers to cataloguing specific instances in a
comprehensive manner. See Leipold, supra note 1, at 308 n.217; infra subpart II.B–Part III. R
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instances of grand jury nullification merely seek to frustrate an indi-
vidual prosecution from going forward;29 others reflect an empow-
ered grand jury, acting as the voice of the community, which intends
to send a message directly to the government regarding its views of the
criminal laws or their application.30  Indeed, a grand jury might de-
cline to indict despite probable cause in a particular case for more
than one reason.31  The various rationales for grand jury nullification,
though sometimes overlapping, are divisible into four categories.32
1. Unjust or Unconstitutional Law
A grand jury might nullify in response to a criminal law that the
jurors find contrary to their sense of justice or outside the sovereign’s
criminalization power.33  For example, members of a nineteenth-cen-
tury grand jury who shared the belief that every person has a human
right to education might have nullified a prosecution of an individual
for violating laws against teaching enslaved African Americans to
read—regardless of the quantum of evidence against the accused.
Likewise, a grand jury might determine that a criminal statute violates
the Constitution and refuse to indict the accused under that law.34
29 See Simmons, supra note 3, at 49 (summarizing examples of cases in which the R
grand jury may have rejected the prosecutor’s decision to prosecute a “borderline” case).
30 See Susan W. Brenner, The Voice of the Community: A Case for Grand Jury Independence,
3 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 67, 121 (1995); Simmons, supra note 3, at 46, 51.  Also, the grand R
jury does not necessarily need to return a no true bill to achieve its aims.  The very threat
of the no true bill in a particular case, or in a category of cases, may be sufficient to com-
municate the grand jury’s message. See Leipold, supra note 1, at 308 n.217; infra Part II. R
31 See, e.g., United States v. Marcucci, 299 F.3d 1156, 1163 (9th Cir. 2002) (“It would
be impossible to tell whether the motivation not to indict was, for example, based on local
politics, racial or other discrimination, or anti-government sentiment . . . .”).
32 In their thought-provoking works on petit jury nullification, both Professor Darryl
Brown and Professor Nancy Marder have delineated categories of nullification-provoking
scenarios that are helpful organizing tools in the grand jury nullification context. See
Brown, supra note 4, at 1171–96; Nancy S. Marder, The Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93 NW. U. R
L. REV. 877, 887–902 (1999).  Professor Marder has sketched out categories of petit jury
nullification: (1) refusal to apply the law to a particular defendant; (2) refusal to apply a
law with which the jurors disagree; (3) response to extra-legal factors such as unsatisfactory
social conditions; and (4) hybrids of the first three categories. See Marder, supra, at
887–902.  Professor Brown has outlined four categories, comprising nullification in re-
sponse to: (1) uncorrected rule violations; (2) unjust laws or norm violations; (3) biased or
unjust application of law; and (4) desires to uphold illegal or immoral community norms.
See Brown, supra note 4, at 1171–96. R
33 Cf. Brown, supra note 4, at 1178–79 (describing this motivation in the petit juror R
context); Gerard N. Magliocca, The Philosopher’s Stone: Dualist Democracy and the Jury, 69 U.
COLO. L. REV. 175, 178 (1998) (same).
34 The historical record indicates that the concept of petit jury review—the preroga-
tive of juries to declare a statute unconstitutional—has been embraced at various times in
America. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 239–42 (2005);
Harris G. Mirkin, Judicial Review, Jury Review & the Right of Revolution Against Despotism, 6
POLITY 36, 55–63 (1973).  Certainly, a grand jury might determine that a criminal law con-
travenes the Constitution of the United States and decline to return an indictment for that
reason.
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2. Unwise Law or Application of Law
Similarly, a grand jury might nullify based on its opinion on the
perceived wisdom (or lack thereof) of a criminal law or its application.
A grand jury might decide that a particular statute criminalizes con-
duct that the criminal law should not proscribe.35  Even when a grand
jury does not take issue with the wisdom of a criminal law generally, it
might determine that its application to a particular defendant or in a
particular community is unwise.36  For example, a grand jury might
understand the need for a federal law banning a certain type of high-
powered hunting rifle, but the grand jury might nevertheless question
the law’s necessity in its rural community where hunting is ubiquitous
and local game requires a particular gauge of weapon.  A grand jury
might also decide that it should not apply a criminal law to a defen-
dant’s conduct in a particular case.37  For example, a grand jury might
refuse to indict a hospice manager for violating a statute outlawing
distribution of a recreational drug that terminally ill patients widely
use for its therapeutic effects.  Despite a belief in aggressive narcotics
enforcement and clear evidence that the accused violated the statute
by distributing the contraband to patients, the grand jury might disap-
prove of applying the statute in the particular case.
3. Biased or Unwise Allocation of Prosecutorial Resources
A grand jury might nullify in response to what it perceives to be
an unfair or unwise allocation of limited prosecutorial resources.  For
example, a grand jury might decline to indict based on the belief that
the defendant is being targeted because of prosecutorial bias.38  Like-
wise, if it were well known that an elected prosecutor with higher po-
litical aspirations deliberately targeted potential opponents for
investigation and prosecution, then a grand jury might refuse to coop-
erate, regardless of the would-be defendants’ culpability.  In addition,
a grand jury might determine that a matter is better handled in a civil
action or that an offense should by prosecuted by a different sover-
35 See Leipold, supra note 1, at 288. R
36 See Simmons, supra note 3, at 16 (“Throughout history, the grand jury maintained R
and enhanced its reputation because it was acting as the political voice of the people in the
community. . . .  [T]he grand jury wielded that power to bring about an outcome consis-
tent with the majority view of the community at that time and place, regardless of the
strength of the case or the prevailing legal standard.”).
37 Cf. Brown, supra note 4, at 1183–85 (examining particular circumstances that could R
prompt petit jury nullification).
38 Cf., e.g., Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 678 (1995) (suggesting the prosecution of Washington D.C.
Mayor Marion Barry as an example of a perceived biased prosecution that arguably
prompted petit jury nullification); Elsa Walsh & Barton Gellman, Chasm Divided Jurors in
Barry Drug Trial, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 1990, at A1 (describing racial dynamics of juror
deliberations in the Barry trial).
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eign; for example, a federal grand jury might refuse to indict because
the conduct also is covered by state criminal law.  A grand jury also
might decide that the thrust of the government’s enforcement pro-
gram represents a poor allocation of resources.  For instance, a grand
jury might object to a prosecutor’s decision to pursue nonviolent drug
offenders when that prosecutor might redirect resources to prevent
violent offenses in the community.39  A grand jury in that same com-
munity might decline to indict an elderly resident for illegal posses-
sion of a handgun, considering that the resident lives alone in a high-
crime area with inadequate police presence.
4. Improper Motivation
This final category describes a motivation that even proponents
of nullification would consider illegitimate—a motivation that Profes-
sor Darryl Brown describes as the desire to uphold immoral commu-
nity norms.40  For example, a grand jury might decline to indict in the
face of sufficient evidence for trivial reasons, such as because the de-
fendant is a celebrity41 or simply because the prosecutor displays a
disagreeable or abrasive personality.42  Furthermore, despite grand ju-
ries’ secrecy and anonymity, they might nevertheless encounter
outside influences and nullify due to corruption, intimidation, or in-
appropriate consideration of sympathetic public sentiment for a par-
ticular defendant.43
Likewise, a grand jury might nullify out of bias or prejudice,44
refusing to indict a defendant because he belongs to a favored race or
because the alleged victim belongs to a disfavored race.45  Indeed, of
the types of nullification motives in this category, the one with the
most ignoble history in this country is racial prejudice.46  Grand and
39 See Butler, supra note 38, at 715–16 (advocating race-based petit jury nullification R
for nonviolent offenses but arguing for conviction of violent offenders); see also Ed Burns et
al., Saving Cities, and Souls, TIME, Mar. 17, 2008, at 50 (espousing petit jury nullification in
cases involving non-violent drug offenses).
40 See Brown, supra note 4, at 1191–96. R
41 See LEROY D. CLARK, THE GRAND JURY: THE USE AND ABUSE OF POLITICAL POWER 20
(1975).
42 See Leipold, supra note 1, at 288 n.142, 309; Dan Markel, Against Mercy, 88 MINN. L. R
REV. 1421, 1457 (2004).
43 See, e.g., Charge to Grand Jury, 30 F. Cas. 992, 994–95 (C.C.D. Cal. 1872) (No.
18,255).
44 See Leipold, supra note 1, at 288; Judith M. Beall, Note, What Do You Do with a R
Runaway Grand Jury?: A Discussion of the Problems and Possibilities Opened up by the Rocky Flats
Grand Jury Investigation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 617, 629 (1998) (“Grand jurors frequently re-
flected the prejudices of their community, indicting the unpopular and the politically
powerless.”).
45 Cf. Marder, supra note 32, at 888 (discussing the role of racial animus in the con- R
text of petit jury nullification).
46 See CLAY S. CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION: THE EVOLUTION OF A DOCTRINE 167
(1998).
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petit juries alike have furthered the invidious racial violence and op-
pression that plagued communities in the United States.47  For in-
stance, as Professor Owen Fiss highlights:
In the 1960s the risk of jury nullification was particularly pro-
nounced in southern communities, where the human rights victim
typically was black and the accused white.  The racial polarization of
the community could easily be exploited to devalue the life of the
black victims or to exonerate or excuse the defendant.48
This improper potential motivation for grand jury discretion,
though regrettable and unavoidable,49 can—and often does—overlap
47 See, e.g., Clay S. Conrad, Scapegoating the Jury, 7 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 7, 21–34
(1997).
48 OWEN FISS, The Awkwardness of the Criminal Law, in THE LAW AS IT COULD BE 133,
136 (2003) (discussing petit jury nullification).
49 Professor Fiss, of course, raises a significant challenge to the normative case for
grand jury discretion.  As Judge John Minor Wisdom noted, however, the ability of some
grand juries to use their power for these purposes is an unavoidable by-product of the
grand jury’s independence. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 190 (5th Cir. 1965)
(Wisdom, J., concurring specially); see also United States v. Marcucci, 299 F.3d 1156, 1167
(9th Cir. 2002) (Hawkins, J., dissenting) (“[R]egardless of its apparent virtues and vices,
the requirement of the grand jury’s independent exercise of its discretion is a fixed star in
our constitutional universe.”).  Additionally, in communities where racial prejudice might
infect the votes of a majority of grand jurors, other actors in the criminal justice system may
share similar biases. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 4, at 1194–95.  While this may be of little R
comfort, it does support the notion that grand jury deliberations are not necessarily more
susceptible to bias than other exercises of unreviewable discretion throughout the criminal
process. Cf. Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U.
PA. L. REV. 335, 366–67 (2005) (“Room for the exercise of discretion also can give opportu-
nity to malevolent influences such as racism, sexism, and the like.”).  Indeed, there were
instances in the Jim Crow South in which grand juries returned indictments for crimes
committed against African Americans but the petit jury declined to convict. See, e.g., GAIL
WILLIAMS O’BRIEN, THE COLOR OF THE LAW: RACE, VIOLENCE, AND JUSTICE IN THE POST-
WORLD WAR II SOUTH 185 & n.14 (1999) (noting the “first lynching indictment” secured
from a grand jury in Mississippi, which ended without a guilty verdict at trial); Conrad,
supra note 47, at 32–33.  Perhaps the most prominent example is the infamous Emmet Till R
case, in which an all-white jury acquitted the defendants in just over an hour. See Bad News
for NAACP, JACKSON DAILY NEWS, Sept. 8, 1955, reprinted in THE LYNCHING OF EMMETT TILL:
A DOCUMENTARY NARRATIVE 40 (Christopher Metress ed. 2002); James L. Kilgallen, Defend-
ants Receive Handshakes, Kisses, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL, Sept. 24, 1955, reprinted in THE
LYNCHING OF EMMETT TILL: A DOCUMENTARY NARRATIVE 104 (Christopher Metress ed.,
2002).  Furthermore, the monumental changes in grand juror selection prompted by the
1968 Jury Selection and Service Act have spurred progress toward the cross-sectional ideal.
See Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1821, 1861–1869, 1871 (2000)
(affording litigants rights to juries that are representative of the community and prohibit-
ing discrimination against potential jurors).  There is no longer a “key-man” system under
which grand jurors are handpicked. See id. §§ 1861, 1863.  Grand jurors are now more
likely to be representative of their community. See id. §§ 1861–1863; Kevin K. Washburn,
Restoring the Grand Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333, 2369 & n.178 (2008) (noting that al-
though “the countermajoritarian nature of the grand jury can have troubling conse-
quences, . . . these dire consequences occurred only because significant portions of the
relevant communities were denied participation as jurors in criminal justice processes”).
But see FISS, supra note 48, at 136 (arguing that “even when the [petit] jury more adequately R
reflected a cross section of the community [the nullification] problem was not entirely
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with the motivations for grand jury discretion described in the other
categories above.50
C. Beyond the Normative Debate
Perhaps one’s normative view of grand jury nullification differs
with the circumstances that surround a particular exercise of discre-
tion.  One might countenance a grand jury’s having mercy on a sym-
pathetic defendant in an individual case.51  Another might tolerate
grand jury nullification only where the grand jury acted out of con-
cern that the prosecutor was applying the law unevenly and unfairly.52
Yet another might condemn grand jury nullification for any reason
other than the grand jury’s shared belief that a law was unjust.53  One
might tolerate grand jury nullification for any reason other than polit-
ical beliefs, religious convictions, or other biases that grand jurors
might hold against the government or the victim.54  Finally, one might
consider grand jury nullification to be dangerous and illegitimate in
all circumstances, precisely because grand juries can nullify in any
eliminated” because “a conviction could be blocked by one or two jurors”). See generally
Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through Community Representa-
tion, 52 VAND. L. REV. 353, 360–65 (1999) (explaining the advantages of representative
juries).  Of course, in the grand jury context, it typically would take twelve of the twenty-
three grand jurors to block an indictment. See infra note 156. R
50 See, e.g., Marder, supra note 32, at 892.  For example, one may approve of grand jury R
nullification in an attempted criminal prosecution under the oppressive nineteenth-cen-
tury slave codes but disapprove of grand juries exercising that same discretion when refus-
ing to indict Ku Klux Klan members for clear violations of criminal civil-rights statutes.  See,
e.g., BLANCHE DAVIS BLANK, THE NOT SO GRAND JURY: THE STORY OF THE FEDERAL GRAND
JURY SYSTEM 6 (1993); CONRAD, supra note 46, at 167–90; cf. Editorial, When Jurors Ignore the R
Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 27, 1997, at A16 (“Nullification . . . kept fugitive slaves from being
sent back to the South, when juries refused to enforce fugitive-slave laws before the Civil
War.  But history is also replete with examples of shameful acts of nullification, like the
hung juries in the 1964 trials for the murder of Medgar Evers, the civil rights leader.”).
However, an observer presumably might characterize either grand jury as nullifying laws
that the jurors genuinely perceived as unjust or unwise, or thwarting prosecutions the ju-
rors subjectively believed were borne of bias. See Leipold, supra note 1, at 288 & n.142, 309. R
This, along with Professor Fiss’s observation, see FISS, supra note 48, at 136, illustrates per- R
haps the central difficulty with the normative case for exercises of discretion by grand
juries.
51 See Markel, supra note 42, at 1456–59; see also Stephanos Bibas, Forgiveness in Crimi- R
nal Procedure, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 329, 341 (2007). See generally Carol S. Steiker, Tempering
or Tampering? Mercy and the Administration of Criminal Justice, in FORGIVENESS, MERCY, AND
CLEMENCY 16 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds., 2007) (exploring the conceptual role of
mercy in discretionary judgments made in the criminal justice system); Rachel E. Barkow,
The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise of Mercy, 121 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming
2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1019071 (discuss-
ing how certain exercises of mercy, including jury nullification, are weakened in the ad-
ministrative state).
52 See Brown, supra note 4, at 1171–96; Butler, supra note 38, at 705–12. R
53 See Brown, supra note 4, at 1183–91; Marder, supra note 32, at 888–93. R
54 See Leipold, supra note 1, at 308–09. R
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\93-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq: 15 29-APR-08 10:27
2008] GRAND JURY DISCRETION 717
kind of case and for any reason at all—even for reasons we find
repulsive.55
The knotty normative questions that grand jury nullification
presents are further complicated by the long shadow cast by petit jury
nullification.  To be sure, the term “jury nullification” carries signifi-
cant baggage.  The question of whether petit juries should nullify has
been hotly debated in many volumes of academic and judicial com-
mentary, and deep skepticism about both the legitimacy and desirabil-
ity of petit jury nullification animates much of the scholarship and
case law.56  Critiques of petit jury nullification include concerns that
the practice is counterdemocratic,57 frustrates justice in the individual
case,58 and diminishes public safety by hindering the effective enforce-
ment of the criminal law.59  As a result of the skepticism over petit jury
nullification, even commentators who recognize the grand jury’s po-
tential role in giving voice to the community’s conscience might shy
away from considering the grand jury’s exercise of discretion as a le-
gitimate expression of that conscience.  This apparent incongruity re-
sults, in part, from the fact that grand jury nullification remains laden
with the baggage that renders petit jury nullification so odious to
many, even though grand jury nullification is analytically and histori-
cally distinct in many ways.
Although this Article does not claim to settle the normative de-
bate over petit and grand jury nullification, it does seek to challenge
the dominant substantive critiques of grand jury discretion: (1) grand
jury discretion subverts the rule of law;60 (2) the grand jury possesses
55 See id. at 309 (noting the potential for grand jury nullification to serve as a “potent
force for frustrating legitimate societal objectives”).  However, as is discussed below, see
infra subpart III.A, virtually every other discretion-wielding actor in the criminal justice
system can make decisions on any of these bases—even those many might consider illegiti-
mate.  For an intriguing study of possible links between perceived petit jury nullification,
community disrespect, and diminished compliance with the law, see Janice Nadler, Flouting
the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399 (2005).
56 Compare Crispo et al., supra note 13, at 3–4 (arguing strongly against petit jury nulli- R
fication, as it leads to “inconsistent application of laws, allows bad law to remain on the
books, and permits juries to disregard the law without accountability”), with LYSANDER
SPOONER, AN ESSAY ON THE TRIAL BY JURY 189–91 (1852) (arguing that a juror must have
complete discretion to render any verdict, regardless of the defendant’s potential guilt),
and Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury “Nullification”: When May and Should a Jury Reject the
Law to Do Justice?, 30 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 239, 240–41 (1992) (arguing that “judges can and
should exercise their discretion to allow nullification by flexibly applying the concepts of
relevancy and prejudice and by admitting evidence bearing on moral values”).  See generally
Teresa Conaway et al., Jury Nullification: A Selective, Annotated Bibliography, 39 VAL. U. L. REV.
393 (2004) (listing scores of articles and other commentary debating the merits of petit
jury nullification).
57 See Andrew D. Leipold, Rethinking Jury Nullification, 82 VA. L. REV. 253, 297–99
(1996).
58 See id. at 306–09.
59 See id. at 260–63.
60 See infra Part II.
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unwarranted discretion relative to other actors in the criminal justice
system;61 and (3) grand jury discretion necessarily detracts from the
effectiveness of the criminal justice system.62  In questioning the criti-
cism that the grand jury’s exercise of robust discretion necessarily
amounts to lawlessness and undermines the efficiency and efficacy of
criminal justice, this Article reveals important features of the nature
and role of the grand jury in the constitutional and procedural frame-
work of our system of criminal justice.
II
THE COMPATIBILITY OF GRAND JURY DISCRETION WITH
CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND THE RULE OF LAW
The most powerful and potentially damning substantive critique
of grand jury discretion is the charge that the practice is subversive of
the rule of law.  Although a taxonomy of the many complexities of the
rule-of-law concept is beyond the scope of this Article,63 “[a]t the
heart of the rule of law is the powerful idea that it is law that should
govern society and not that the arbitrary will of particular persons—a
government of laws, not persons.”64  While consensus regarding the
conceptual contours of the rule of law may be fleeting, the main-
stream American reaction to perceived violations of the rule of law is
condemnation.65
Pretermitting formulations of the rule-of-law ideal that emphasize
substantive notions of justice,66 a hallmark of the rule of law is the
avoidance of arbitrariness and the cabining of the discretion of gov-
ernment actors.67  Nowhere is such discretion and potential for arbi-
61 See infra Part III.
62 See infra Part IV.
63 See, e.g., DONALD L. DOERNBERG, SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OR THE RULE OF LAW: THE
NEW FEDERALISM’S CHOICE 179–83 (2005); Judith N. Shklar, Political Theory and the Rule of
Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 1, 1–16 (Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick
Monahan eds., 1987).
64 Allan C. Hutchinson, The Rule of Law Revisited: Democracy and Courts, in RECRAFTING
THE RULE OF LAW: THE LIMITS OF LEGAL ORDER 196 (David Dyzenhaus ed., 1999) (emphasis
omitted).
65 See, e.g., James L. Gibson, Changes in American Veneration for the Rule of Law, 56
DEPAUL L. REV. 593, 593 (2007) (“[American] support for the rule of law is widespread—
especially compared to other nations—and . . . has not diminished in the last decade.”);
Joseph Raz, Formalism and the Rule of Law, in NATURAL LAW THEORY 309, 309 (Robert P.
George ed., 1992) (“Though not uncommonly it will be disputed whether a violation oc-
curred, hardly anyone will actually argue that it was justified if it took place.”).
66 See, e.g., RONALD A. CASS, THE RULE OF LAW IN AMERICA 15 (2001); DOERNBERG,
supra note 63, at 190–97; GEOFFREY DE Q. WALKER, THE RULE OF LAW: FOUNDATION OF R
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 11–14 (1988).
67 See, e.g., John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal Stat-
utes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 212 (1985) (“The rule of law signifies the constraint of arbitrari-
ness in the exercise of government power.”); see also FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE HABITS OF
LEGALITY: CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW 14 (1996) (“The notion of the rule of
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trariness as far ranging as in the enforcement of the criminal law.68
One of the several principles philosopher Joseph Raz has delineated
as derived from the rule of law is that “discretion of the crime-prevent-
ing agencies should not be allowed to pervert the law.”69  As Raz ex-
plains, prosecutors and law enforcement officials subvert the rule of
law when they exercise discretion or allocate resources in attempts to
avoid enforcing certain criminal laws or pursuing certain classes of
offenders.70
Concern over the rule of law likewise renders nullifying juries
subject to scrutiny.  The traditional rule-of-law critique of petit jury
nullification71—and, by extension, grand jury nullification—is that
“[n]ullification entails the rule of [jurors] . . . arbitrarily deciding to
resolve a case according to their own political and moral beliefs rather
than applying the general rule that has governed other, comparable
cases.”72  Even where one deems the rationale for nullification accept-
able in a given context, the rule of law still condemns its exercise.73
Under this rule-of-law critique, a grand jury must indict where a
prosecutor has presented sufficient evidence that the accused commit-
ted the alleged crimes.74  When the government has met its burden of
demonstrating probable cause, the argument goes, the grand jury
should indict the accused if it is to act consistently with the rule of
law.75  Failing to indict in such a situation, regardless of the normative
law is one that seeks to impose limits on and provide guidance for the exercise of official
power.”).
68 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 49, at 344–45 (considering judicial discretion and R
observing that “[t]he danger is not just arbitrary application by judges but . . . arbitrary
application by other decisions makers in the criminal justice process, with ‘the potential
for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement of the penal law’” (citation omitted)).
69 JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 218 (1979).
70 See id.
71 See, e.g., Butler, supra note 38, at 705–06 (1995) (“The idea that jury nullification R
undermines the rule of law is the most common criticism of the doctrine.”).  Professor
Butler observes that rule of law critiques of jury nullification are moral rather than legal,
given the irrefutable power of the petit jury to acquit contrary to the evidence. See id. at
705.
72 Brown, supra note 4, at 1159.  However, as Professor Darryl Brown persuasively ex- R
plained, a post-realist conception of the rule of law, which features among its attributes an
expanded notion of legitimate law-giving sources and their use in a contextual interpreta-
tion of legal rules, may accommodate the compatibility of jury nullification with the rule of
law. See id. at 1159–71; see also Butler, supra note 38, at 705–14 (responding to rule-of-law R
critiques of principled jury nullification); Michael T. Cahill, Punishment Decisions at Convic-
tion: Recognizing the Jury as Fault Finder, 2005 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 91, 117 (2005) (citing
Brown’s argument that petit jury nullification need not be seen as lawlessness).
73 See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 18 (1910)
(characterizing jury nullification as “the great corrective of law in its actual administration”
but nonetheless referring to it as “[j]ury lawlessness”).
74 See Brown, supra note 4, at 1160. R
75 See id.
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appeal of the grand jury’s rationale, signals disregard for this clear
rule and, ultimately, subverts the rule of law.76
Adherence to the rule of law, however, does not prohibit all dis-
cretion.  Rather, the rule of law condemns the exercise of unwarranted
discretion.77  Where a government of laws yields a process that affords
appropriate discretion to certain actors, the exercise of such discre-
tion can be consistent with the rule of law.78
This Part challenges the premise that the rule of law is incompati-
ble with the grand jury’s robust discretion to decide on bases beyond
sufficiency of the evidence.  Such discretion can comply with the rule
of law both because the grand jury is not limited—by either tradition
or constitutional design—to merely screening criminal cases for prob-
able cause and because the grand jury’s robust discretion enhances its
ability to perform its intended constitutional role—facilitating horizon-
tal separation of powers through checks and balances and moderating
criminal law federalism.  In this way, grand jury nullification is not
only consistent with the rule of law, but it buttresses the rule of law in
an important manner.
A. Redefining Terms: Contours of the Rule of Law
The rule-of-law critique of grand jury discretion rests on the pre-
mise that the grand jury was designed to operate as a mere probable
cause filter.79  Although probable cause is the current evidentiary stan-
dard,80 the applicable standard has shifted considerably, often chang-
ing in response to dominant political views regarding the appropriate
role of the grand jury.81  Indeed, today’s probable cause standard is
76 Cf. State v. Ragland, 519 A.2d 1361, 1372 (N.J. 1986) (declaring that “[j]ury nullifi-
cation is an unfortunate but unavoidable power”).  Professors Kaimi Wenger and David
Hoffman have described ways in which petit jury nullification might perform certain func-
tions—protective, equitable, and participatory—consistent with the rule of law. See Kaimi-
pono David Wenger & David Hoffman, Nullificatory Juries, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 1115, 1149–56
(2003).  Professor Paul Butler has questioned the conceptual legitimacy of the rule of law,
arguing that “[i]f the rule of law is a myth . . . the criticism that jury nullification under-
mines it loses force.”  Butler, supra note 38, at 708. R
77 See, e.g., SAMUEL WALKER, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1950–1990, at 23–25 (1993).
78 See, e.g., id.
79 See, e.g., Brenner, supra note 30, at 100–01. R
80 See id.
81 See SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 42 (“The history of grand jury [evidentiary] stan- R
dards . . . is marked by frequent, and essentially political, conflicts over the proper role of
the institution itself.”).  For more than four centuries, evidentiary standards governing the
grand jury’s inquiry evolved from mere rumor and “suspicion” to “probable evidence” to
“satisfied belief” to “prima facie” to the current “probable cause” standard. See id. at 47–48,
58–59, 78–86, 96–98.  At their core, these debates in England and America were as much
about the role, power, and independence of the grand jury as they were about evidentiary
standards, with many attempting to frame the institution by shaping its discretion and nul-
lification power. See, e.g., Bushell’s Case, (1670) 124 Eng. Rep. 1006, 1011–12 (C.P.) (rul-
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distinct from the significantly more robust “truth of the accusation”
standard used when the grand jury right was enshrined in the Bill of
Rights.82  However, regardless of the standard that grand juries used
at any given time, they have always exercised power to decline to in-
dict despite evidence satisfying the governing standard.83  Even when
the evidentiary threshold was more exacting than probable cause,
grand juries were not bound to indict when the prosecutor presented
evidence satisfying that prevailing standard.84
Since the formative stages of the grand jury in England, grand
juries have engaged in nullification.  Almost all contemporary histori-
cal accounts of the grand jury’s development treat the late-seven-
teenth-century Colledge 85  and Shaftesbury 86 cases as the turning point
in the life of the English grand jury—where it began to transform
from an exclusive tool of the monarchy to a protector of subjects
against the power of the Crown.87  These two cases focused on the
attempted royal prosecution of Stephen Colledge and Anthony Ashley
Cooper, the Earl of Shaftesbury, for high treason.88  Both men were
accused of conspiring to diminish Roman Catholic influence over the
monarchy.89  The grand juries in both cases refused to indict the Prot-
estant defendants, despite significant pressure from the Crown and
rigging of the grand jury process against the accused.90  As a result,
the Colledge and Shaftesbury cases stand as a symbolic turning point for
the grand jury in England, after which the grand jury ceased to be a
ing that courts were powerless to jail or fine grand and petit jurors who reached decisions
contrary to the court’s view of the evidence).  For an overview of Bushell’s Case and its
historical and political context, see Simon Stern, Note, Between Local Knowledge and National
Politics: Debating Rationales for Jury Nullification After Bushell’s Case, 111 YALE L.J. 1815,
1822–27 (2002).
82 See JOSEPH CHITTY, 1 A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 261 (1819);
Thomas Y. Davies, The Fictional Character of Law-and-Order Originalism: A Case Study of the
Distortion and Evasions of Framing-Era Arrest Doctrine in Atwater v. Lago Vista, 37 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 239, 427–28 (2002) (noting that the framing-era grand jury “did not merely assess
whether there was probable cause for a prosecution; rather, at common law, grand jurors
were usually instructed not to indict unless they were persuaded, based on the prosecutor’s
evidence, of the ‘truth’ of the accusation”); Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know
and When Did They Know It?: Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L.
REV. 105, 210–12 & n.333 (2005).
83 Chief Justice John Roberts recently affirmed this principle. See Transcript of Oral
Argument at 16–17, United States v. Resendiz-Ponce, 127 S. Ct. 782 (2007) (No. 05-998)
(“[H]istorically a significant role for the grand jury has been not to indict people even
though the Government had the evidence to indict them.”).
84 See id.
85 8 How. St. Tr. 549 (1681).
86 8 How. St. Tr. 759 (1681).
87 See GEORGE J. EDWARDS, JR., THE GRAND JURY 28–30 (1906).
88 See id.
89 See id.
90 See Shaftesbury’s Case, 8 How. St. Tr. 759; The Trial of Stephen Colledge, 8 How. St. Tr.
549; SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 62–65. R
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passive facilitator for criminal prosecutions by the Crown and began
to assume a more robust role.91
The American colonial grand jury, the direct descendant of these
English grand juries, played a part in expressing colonists’ dissatisfac-
tion with the exercise of monarchical power as it aggressively issued
“angry and well-publicized presentments and indictments” against
representatives of the monarchy and nullified attempted prosecutions
of critics of the Crown.92  For example, a 1743 grand jury refused to
indict New York publisher Peter Zenger for seditious libel against the
Royal Governor of New York, even though Zenger was technically
guilty for publishing stories critical of the governor.93  Colonial grand
juries famously resisted prosecutions under the British trade and navi-
gation laws and refused to indict colonial protesters of British laws
whose prosecutions were thought to be unfair; for example, in 1765 a
Boston grand jury declined to indict the Stamp Act rioters.94  Follow-
ing the American Revolution and the ratification of the Grand Jury
Clause in the Bill of Rights,95 grand juries nullified prosecutions
under the Alien and Sedition Acts96 and under the Fugitive Slave Act
and Reconstruction-era civil rights laws.97
As these historical accounts reveal, probable cause is merely an
evidentiary standard and not a framework for the grand jury’s defin-
ing purpose.98  The probable cause standard does not describe the
grand jury’s power to render a decision on bases beyond sufficiency of
the evidence.99  The grand jury’s robust discretionary power was a pri-
91 See EDWARDS, supra note 87, at 28–30; SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 62–65. R
92 See Rene´e B. Lettow, Note, Reviving Federal Grand Jury Presentments, 103 YALE L.J.
1333, 1337 (1994); see also SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 87; Mark Kadish, Behind the Locked Door R
of an American Grand Jury: Its History, Its Secrecy, and Its Process, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 11
(1996); Ronald F. Wright, Why Not Administrative Grand Juries?, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 465, 469
(1992) (“These [colonial] grand juries did not refuse to indict because of a lack of proof
that the accused had violated a criminal statute.  Rather, they refused because they funda-
mentally disagreed with the government’s decision to enforce these laws at all.”).
93 See Robert D. Rucker, The Right to Ignore the Law: Constitutional Entitlement Versus
Judicial Interpretation, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 449, 452–53 (1999). The government then side-
stepped the grand jury and charged Zenger by information. See id. A petit jury later  ac-
quitted, despite the fairly clear evidence of Zenger’s technical guilt. See id.; see also Albert
W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United States, 61 U.
CHI. L. REV. 867, 871–74 (1994).
94 See, e.g., SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 87. R
95 U.S. CONST. amend. V.
96 See, e.g., RICHARD D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE’S PANEL: THE GRAND JURY IN THE UNITED
STATES, 1634–1941, at 49–52 (1963). See generally United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d
1184, 1191–94 (9th Cir. 2005) (discussing the role of the colonial grand jury).
97 See, e.g., YOUNGER, supra note 96, at 103–05, 118–33; see also Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d R
at 1199.
98 See, e.g., Kuckes, supra note 7, at 1303.  As Professor Kuckes points out, the “judi- R
cial” model, which conceptually limits the grand jury to the probable cause determination,
invites one to negatively characterize the grand jury’s exercise of discretion. See id. at 1269.
99 See id.
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mary feature of the institution emblazoned on the consciousness of
the Founders as they drew from the lessons of the colonial experience
in constructing American democracy.100  Today, the grand jury retains
its power to exercise robust discretion on bases beyond sufficiency of
the evidence.
The Supreme Court recognized the grand jury’s robust discretion
when it acknowledged that “[t]he grand jury does not determine only
that probable cause exists to believe that a defendant committed a
crime, or that it does not.”101  In Vasquez v. Hillery, the Court ex-
plained that “ ‘[t]he grand jury is not bound to indict in every case
where a conviction can be obtained.’”102  The Court’s recognition of
the grand jury’s discretionary power parallels that of a number of
prominent jurists.  Judge John Minor Wisdom recognized “the power
of the grand jury to shield suspected law violators”103 and the grand
jury’s “unchallengeable power to shield the guilty, should the whims
of the jurors or their conscious or subconscious response to commu-
nity pressures induce twelve or more jurors to give sanctuary to the
guilty.”104  Judge Henry Friendly noted that the grand jury’s discre-
tionary ability to grant mercy to accused who are likely guilty is “im-
plicit in [the grand jury’s] role.”105  Other jurists have affirmed the
notion that the grand jury has an unqualified power to decline to in-
dict regardless of the evidence placed before it.106
100 See SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 87. R
101 Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986).
102 Id. (quoting United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 629 (2d Cir. 1979)
(Friendly, J., dissenting)).  To be sure, the Court has sent mixed messages in this regard,
more recently implying that a grand jury may have a duty to indict when there is evidence
sufficient to establish probable cause. See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002).
103 United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 189 (5th Cir. 1965) (Wisdom, J., concurring
specially).
104 Id. at 190.
105 Ciambrone, 601 F.2d at 629 n.2 (Friendly, J., dissenting).
106 See, e.g., United States v. Marcucci, 299 F.3d 1156, 1168–69 (9th Cir. 2002) (Haw-
kins, J., dissenting); Gaither v. United States, 413 F.2d 1061, 1066 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1969)
(“Since it has the power to refuse to indict even when a clear violation of law is shown, the
grand jury can reflect the conscience of the community in providing relief where strict
application of the law would prove unduly harsh.” (quoting 8 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE
§ 6.02(1) (1968))); United States v. Asdrubal-Herrera, 470 F. Supp. 939, 942 (N.D. Ill.
1979) (“Just as a prosecutor can, in the exercise of discretion, decline prosecution in the
first instance, a grand jury can return a true bill or no bill as they deem fit.”).  Professor
Herbert Wechsler, in support of a proposal to include a de minimis “defense” (Section
2.12) to the Model Penal Code, noted that “[n]othing is more common in criminal law
enforcement, of course, than the exercise on the part of the prosecuting attorney, to some
extent—grand juries where there are grand juries—of a kind of unarticulated authority to
mitigate the general provisions of the criminal law to prevent absurd applications . . . .”
Discussion of the Model Penal Code, 39 A.L.I. PROC. 61, 105 (1962).  For more on de
minimis stautory provisions, see Stanislaw Pomorski, On Multiculturalism, Concepts of Crime,
and the “De Minimis” Defense, 1997 BYU L. REV. 51 (1997); Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law
Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 211 (1982).
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While many recognize the grand jury’s power to nullify, the legal
culture seems unready or unwilling to fully accept that the grand jury
role implicitly includes a discretionary function.  Advocates and courts
seeking to minimize the grand jury’s nullification power often distin-
guish between the “power” and the “right.”107  They are willing to con-
cede—as they must—that the grand jury possesses the power (or the
ability) to nullify, as no mechanism exists to prevent or remedy the
practice.108  Judge Learned Hand, for example, described grand jury
nullification as “an irresponsible utterance of the community at large,
answerable only to the general body of citizens, from whom they come
at random, and with whom they are again at once merged.”109  Never-
theless, they contend that the grand jury has no right to nullify.110  By
arguing that a nullifying grand jury is doing something it has no right
to do, these advocates and courts essentially characterize grand jury
nullification as lawless.111
This “lawless” view is problematic for a number of reasons.  First,
substantial evidence indicates that the grand jury’s power exists by de-
sign.112  The nullification power is an intended feature of the grand
jury’s robust discretion—not a mere accident borne of a flawed insti-
107 Cf. Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 78–83 (1895) (distinguishing between the
power of a petit jury to nullify and its right to do so); Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of
Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582, 588–89 (1938).
108 See, e.g., Brief for the United States at 28, United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625
(2002) (No. 01-687).  As the U.S. Solicitor General argued in a brief on the merits in a
recent Supreme Court case, grand jury nullification is “a power that courts must tolerate
for reasons of public policy” rather than “a right that courts must encourage.” Id.
109 In re Kittle, 180 F. 946, 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1910) (L. Hand, J.).
110 See, e.g., United States v. Kerley, 838 F.2d 932, 938 (7th Cir. 1988) (stating that the
ability to nullify is “just a power, not also a right”); Todd E. Pettys, Evidentiary Relevance,
Morally Reasonable Verdicts, and Jury Nullification, 86 IOWA L. REV. 467, 503 (2001) (“While
readily conceding that juries have the power to nullify, therefore, the courts have insisted
that juries do not have the right to nullify.”).  Professor Paul Butler, who advanced a case
for race-based petit jury nullification in certain circumstances, see Butler, supra note 38, at R
678, does seem to require a moral justification for the petit jury’s exercise of its nullifica-
tion power. See Paul D. Butler, Race-Based Jury Nullification: Case-in-Chief, 30 J. MARSHALL L.
REV. 911, 918 (1997) (“[I]t is not enough to say that there is a power to nullify; there also
has to be some moral basis for this power.”); see also ALLEN, supra note 67, at 14 (1996) R
(“We can conceive of exertions of governmental authority that are legal in the sense of
being authorized by law but that offend the rule-of-law concept.”).
111 Cf. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694–95 (1984) (stating that a court,
when determining whether an attorney error prejudiced the defendant, “should pre-
sume . . . that the judge or jury acted according to law” and that “[a] defendant has no
entitlement to the luck of a lawless decisionmaker, even if a lawless decision cannot be
reviewed”). See also Daniel J. Meltzer, Deterring Constitutional Violations by Law Enforcement
Officials: Plaintiffs and Defendants as Private Attorneys General, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 247, 257 n.41
(1988).
112 See, e.g., United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 629 n.2 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly,
J., dissenting).
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tutional blueprint.113  Given the Framers’ experience with the grand
jury and its role in nullifying unjust colonial criminal laws and prose-
cutions,114 there is good reason to believe that the grand jury’s nullifi-
cation power is exactly what the Framers intended.  The Framers were
well aware that colonial grand juries communicated dissent to the cen-
tral royal authorities and checked those individuals making, interpret-
ing, and enforcing colonial laws.115  If the Framers did not want
federal grand juries to retain that same power, they easily could have
established a mechanism for judicial review of grand jury decisions.
That they did not establish such a mechanism supports the view that
the grand jury’s exercise of discretion on bases beyond the sufficiency
of the evidence is consistent with the grand jury’s intended role.
Additionally, the use of the “rights” language surrounding grand
jury discretion misunderstands the nature of the grand jury in the first
instance.  As discussed below, the grand jury is a preconstitutional en-
tity that predates the establishment of the three branches of govern-
ment.116  Although the Grand Jury Clause cemented the grand jury’s
position as a central mechanism of individual liberty,117 the preconsti-
tutional status of the grand jury suggests that it was akin to a central
organ of government and not simply a vehicle for applying a criminal
procedural requirement.  Presumably, constitutional limitations could
curtail the grand jury’s nullification prerogative in this regard, as
could procedural practice, common law, or statutory law.118  In the
absence of such a constraint, however, the grand jury does not need
the “right” to exercise its discretion on bases beyond sufficiency of the
evidence.  Shedding the fictions that surround the proper role of the
113 Cf. Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an
Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 46–65 (2003).
114 See, e.g., YOUNGER, supra note 96, at 49–52, 103–05, 118–33. R
115 See, e.g., Lettow, supra note 92, at 1337. R
116 See discussion infra section II.B.1.
117 See United States v. Asdrubal-Herrera, 470 F. Supp. 939, 942 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
118 Indeed, one such limitation on the prerogative of the grand jury surfaced when
criminal defendants asserted that the Fifth Amendment right to grand jury indictment
contemplates that grand juries not be instructed that they “should” vote to indict where the
government establishes probable cause, an argument that the Ninth Circuit recently con-
sidered and rejected over vigorous dissent. See, e.g., United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408
F.3d 1184, 1199 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Rivera-Sillas, 376 F.3d 887, 893–94 (9th
Cir. 2004); United States v. Adams, 343 F.3d 1024, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 2003); United States
v. Marcucci, 299 F.3d 1156, 1159–65 (9th Cir. 2002) (consolidating three identical chal-
lenges).  Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit held that the Constitution does not mandate that
the grand jury receive instruction that it may decline to indict even where it finds probable
cause. See, e.g., Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d at 1199. For commentary on the Ninth Circuit
skirmishes over the model grand jury charge, see Kuckes, supra note 7, at 1299–1300 (en- R
dorsing the dissenters’ reasoning); Gregory T. Fouts, Note, Reading the Grand Jurors Their
Rights: The Continuing Question of Grand Jury Independence, 79 IND. L.J. 323, 334–40 (2004)
(commenting on the Marcucci case); Laurie L. Levinson, Grand Jury Nullification, NAT’L L.J.,
June 14, 2004, at 14.
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grand jury fosters greater recognition that the grand jury’s discretion
is consistent with the rule of law.
B. The Structural Role of Grand Jury Discretion
While the modern conception of the grand jury relegates it to a
mere probable cause filter for serious criminal charges, the grand jury
actually plays a hidden structural role in our constitutional design—it
serves both as a check on the three branches of government and as a
moderator of criminal law federalism.  The characteristics of the
grand jury uniquely equip it to serve as a conduit for communication
between the national government and local communities on issues of
criminal justice policy.  The grand jury’s robust discretion—its ability
to determine the propriety of indictments on bases beyond sufficiency
of the evidence—enhances this function.
1. Separation of Powers/Checks and Balances
Contrary to popular belief, and despite its usual physical location
in the courthouse and its reliance on the process and compulsion
power of the courts, the grand jury is not a part of the judicial
branch.119  Likewise, the grand jury is not an arm of the Executive
even though the prosecutor wields a great deal of (at least perceived)
power over the grand jury.120  While modern grand jury practice may
not evidence the fact, the grand jury is its own constitutional entity,
which checks each of the three branches of government.121  Although
not mentioned in the original written constitution, the grand jury was
a creature of the common law, understood as an independent consti-
tutional entity and intended to play a structural role:122
[U]nder the constitutional scheme, the grand jury is not and should
not be captive to any of the three branches.  The grand jury is a pre-
constitutional institution, given constitutional stature by the Fifth
Amendment but not relegated by the Constitution to a position
within any of the three branches of the government.123
119 See Brenner, supra note 30, at 76–77 (describing confusion over institutional status R
of the grand jury); see also FED. R. CRIM. P. 17 (establishing subpoena power); In re Report
and Recommendation of June 5, 1972 Grand Jury Concerning Transmission of Evidence to
the House of Representatives, 370 F. Supp. 1219, 1222 (D.D.C. 1974).
120 See, e.g., Brenner, supra note 30, at 68–72; Kuckes, supra note 1, at 28–30. R
121 See, e.g., Kuckes, supra note 1, at 28. R
122 See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir. 1965) (Rives, Gewin & Bell, J.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he grand jury originated long before the
doctrine of separation of powers was made the constitutional basis of our frame of govern-
ment. . . .  Its authority is derived from none of the three basic divisions of our govern-
ment, but rather directly from the people themselves.” (internal quotations omitted)).
123 United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir. 1977) (internal citation
omitted).
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As the Supreme Court explained in United States v. Williams,124 the
grand jury “is a constitutional fixture in its own right.  In fact, the
whole theory of its function is that it belongs to no branch of the
institutional Government, serving as kind of a buffer or referee be-
tween the Government and the people.”125
Not only is the grand jury independent of the three branches of
government, but it serves as a check on them.126  In the context of the
judicial branch, Article III provides that “[t]he judicial power shall
extend to all Cases . . . arising under . . . the Laws of the United
States.”127  Although Congress vested the federal courts with jurisdic-
tion over cases arising under criminal statutes,128 this jurisdiction can-
not be exercised in felony and capital cases without the grand jury’s
consent.129  Pursuant to the common law traditions that informed the
Framers and the mandate of the Grand Jury Clause, a felony or capital
criminal case cannot proceed to trial except upon the indictment or
presentment of a grand jury.130  In addition, the grand jury limits
courts’ ability to sentence criminal defendants after a guilty verdict or
plea.131  Thus, the grand jury performs a structural role as gatekeeper
of the federal courts’ exercise of subject matter jurisdiction in crimi-
nal cases.132  The grand jury’s robust discretion to limit the cases that
124 504 U.S. 36 (1992).
125 Id. at 47 (internal citations and quotations omitted).
126 See United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1199 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting
United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir. 1977)).
127 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
128 See 28 U.S.C. § 3231 (2000) (“The district courts of the United states shall have
original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of the States, of all offenses against the laws of
the United States.”).
129 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a) (“An offense (other than criminal contempt) must be
prosecuted by an indictment if it is punishable: (A) by death; or (B) by imprisonment for
more than one year.”).  Of course, a defendant may waive the right to grand jury indict-
ment and allow a court to try and sentence upon an information. See Id. 7(b).  There is
some doubt associated with the constitutionality of this waiver provision. See generally Roger
A. Fairfax, Jr., The Jurisdictional Heritage of the Grand Jury Clause, 91 MINN. L. REV. 398,
430–38 (2006).
130 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . .”).
131 See, e.g., HOWARD C. JOYCE, TREATISE ON THE LAW GOVERNING INDICTMENTS WITH
FORMS § 32 (1908) (“[W]here there has been no presentment of . . . a bill of indictment,
the fact that a person confesse[d] in court to being guilty of a crime which requires an
indictment or presentment, confers no power upon the court to sentence him to imprison-
ment . . . .”).  Although in most cases the sentencing judge’s ability to render punishment
will be limited to that prescribed by the legislature for crimes outlined in the grand jury’s
indictment, the Supreme Court has sometimes strayed from that ideal. See, e.g., United
States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 633–34 (2002) (finding no plain error where the district
court sentenced the defendant for conduct not charged in the indictment).
132 Although a twentieth-century jurisprudence influenced by progressive criminal law
reform and a diminished respect for the efficacy of the grand jury right largely obscured
this function, the jurisdictional heritage of the grand jury demonstrates the way in which
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courts may hear enhances its checking function with regard to the
judicial branch.
The grand jury also checks the executive branch by sometimes
barring prosecution of federal crimes.  Article II charges the Execu-
tive with the duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted.”133  A grand jury must determine whether sufficient evidence
exists to justify a trial, and an affirmative decision will subject a crimi-
nal defendant to the economic, personal, reputational, and psycho-
logical costs of standing trial and defending against the indictment’s
charges.134  Unless and until a grand jury assents, the Executive can-
not press its case.135  The grand jury’s robust discretion allows it to
check the executive branch on bases beyond sufficiency of the evi-
dence.136  The grand jury may frustrate the Executive’s efforts to pros-
ecute an individual where it suspects that the prosecutor has targeted
that individual because of bias or caprice.137  Further, the grand jury
may exercise its discretion to send the Executive a message about its
preferred allocation of law enforcement and prosecutorial resources.
This discretion also can be brought to bear on exercises of
prosecutorial discretion in specific cases.138  The grand jury’s robust
discretion enhances its ability to check the tremendous power of the
Executive in fulfilling its Article II duties related to criminal law en-
forcement and prosecution.
Furthermore, the grand jury checks the legislative branch by de-
termining when conduct that Congress has proscribed will be subject
to criminal prosecution.  The Legislature relies on the Executive and
Judiciary performing their respective constitutional duties of enforc-
ing criminal statutes and entertaining cases arising therefrom.139  Be-
cause the grand jury’s discretion can derail the performance of these
duties,140 it represents another significant check on the legislative
branch.  Not only is the grand jury in a position to decline to allow a
prosecution under a particular criminal statute, it also can influence
the Executive to enforce criminal statutes it otherwise would not.141
the grand jury was designed to play a checking role on the judicial branch. See generally
Fairfax, supra note 129. R
133 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
134 See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51 (1992) (“It is axiomatic that the grand
jury sits not to determine guilt or innocence, but to assess whether there is adequate basis
for bringing a criminal charge.”).
135 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a).
136 See Simmons, supra note 3, at 16. R
137 See, e.g., Butler, supra note 38, at 678. R
138 See id.
139 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 & art. III, § 2.
140 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 7.
141 In fact, at the time of the Founding, the power of grand juries to present or initiate
charges for federal crimes without the prompting or participation of the prosecutor was
well established.  While the Presentment Clause of the Fifth Amendment’s Grand Jury
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As discussed above, the grand jury might consider a particular crimi-
nal statute to be ill-considered or ill-suited and refuse to indict a de-
fendant under it.  Whether motivated, for example, by the perceived
severity of the punishment, the disproportionality of the punishment
to the alleged crime, or the dubious constitutionality of the criminal
statute, the grand jury is well situated to check the Legislature’s power
to proscribe certain conduct and to prescribe criminal sanctions.
This system of checks and balances was central to the Founders’
ideal of a government that would not trample individual rights.142  Al-
though the grand jury is not commonly considered an independent
constitutional entity, it plays an important structural role in criminal
law, where individual rights are particularly subject to encroach-
ment.143  Just as  constitutional structure provides each of the
branches with the prerogative to check the others,144 the grand jury,
with its robust discretion, checks the judicial, executive, and legislative
branches and represents a structural protection of individual rights.
2. Federalism
The grand jury’s robust discretion also allows it to play a struc-
tural role by moderating federalism in the criminal law arena.  The
grand jury serves as a forum for local communities to express their
views about federal criminal laws and enforcement priorities.145  The
English experience was instructive for the American framers.  The En-
glish grand jury, once a vehicle for the hegemony of centralized gov-
ernment, gradually became a vehicle of local input and power.146
Although criminal prosecutions were undertaken pursuant to the laws
of the royal central government, grand juries were composed of mem-
bers from the local community147 and “wielded tremendous authority
in their power to determine who should and who should not face
Clause has not been repealed, the practice has fallen into obsolescence. See, e.g., Fairfax,
supra note 129, at 412 n.55; see also Lettow, supra note 92. R
142 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison).
143 See, e.g., Kuckes, supra note 7, at 1302 (“[T]he power to ‘nullify’ valid charges has R
been described by influential commentators as ‘arguably . . . the most important attribute
of grand jury review from the perspective of those who insisted that a grand jury clause be
included in the Bill of Rights.’” (quoting 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 15.2(g) (2d ed. 1999))).  Interestingly, the separation of powers argument has been ad-
vanced in support of petit jury nullification as well. See, e.g., Nancy J. King, Silencing Nullifi-
cation Advocacy Inside the Jury Room and Outside the Courtroom, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 433, 454–58
(1998).
144 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Wil-
liam Duane (May 23, 1801), in 8 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 1801–1806, at 54
(Paul Leicester Ford ed., New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons 1897); see also Rachel E. Barkow,
Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 1011–20 (2006).
145 See Brenner, supra note 30, at 71. R
146 See SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 42–43. R
147 See id. at 43.
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trial.”148  The colonial experience demonstrated that grand juries
could recalibrate the balance of power between the central govern-
ment and the colonies; colonial grand juries had a rich history of re-
sisting perceived unjust expressions of royal authority through
criminal prosecutions.149  Because of their discretionary power, colo-
nial grand juries “enforced or refused to enforce laws as they saw
fit.”150
For those of the founding generation concerned about the po-
tential aggrandizement of central governmental authority, the grand
jury, much like the petit jury,151 represented a significant check on
the federal criminal prosecution power.152  A grand jury could refuse
to allow the prosecutor to enforce federal law because no prosecution
could proceed within the confines of the grand jury’s district without
its consent.153  For example, because no prosecutor could bring a seri-
ous federal criminal charge against a Virginian without an indictment
from a grand jury of Virginians, there was a strong, localized counter
to the power of the federal government.  Thus, the grand jury offered
local communities a say in how the federal criminal law would be
used.154  Justice James Wilson recognized this very function when he
described the late-eighteenth-century grand jury as “a great channel
of communication, between those who make and administer the laws,
and those for whom the laws are made and administered.”155  Grand
148 YOUNGER, supra note 96, at 26. R
149 See SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 87 (noting politicization of grand juries shortly before R
the Revolution and stating that “[g]rand juries provided a means of frustrating the policies
of imperial authorities.  They sometimes refused to indict political offenders and pre-
vented the enforcement of unpopular laws.”); YOUNGER, supra note 96, at 28–29 (recount- R
ing instances of grand jury nullification in the colonies during the decades before the
Revolution); supra notes 92–94 and accompanying text. R
150 YOUNGER, supra note 96, at 26; see also LEONARD W. LEVY, THE PALLADIUM OF JUSTICE: R
ORIGINS OF TRIAL BY JURY 66–67 (1999).
151 See, e.g., United States v. Datcher, 830 F. Supp. 411, 413 (M.D. Tenn. 1993)
(describing founding-era attitudes toward jury nullification), overruled by United States v.
Chesney, 86 F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 1996).
152 See YOUNGER, supra note 96, at 45–46; Washburn, supra note 49, at 2368–69. R
153 See John P. Kaminski & C. Jennifer Lawton, Duty and Justice at “Every Man’s Door”:
The Grand Jury Charges of Chief Justice John Jay, 1790–1794, 31 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 235, 242
(2006) (noting that, in the late 18th century, “[t]he district of the jurors was commensu-
rate with the borders of the state”).
154 See Brenner, supra note 30, at 127 (“Grand juries are by nature parochial . . . and R
were designed to import a local, lay perspective on the legal significance of [local] activ-
ity.”); Pound, supra note 73, at 18 (“The will of the state at large imposed on a reluctant R
community . . . find[s] the same obstacle in the local jury that formerly confronted kings
and ministers.”).
155 James Wilson, The Subject Continued—Of Juries, in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON
503, 537 (Robert Green McCloskey ed., 1967).  To be sure, this communication channel
worked both ways, as founding-era jurists utilized the grand jury charge as an opportunity
to lecture captive audiences of prominent local citizens on political issues of the day. See
YOUNGER, supra note 96, at 47; cf. Kaminski & Lawton, supra note 153, at 240–50 (describ- R
ing Chief Justice John Jay’s early grand jury charges).
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juries can send a message that a law or its application contradicts local
values.156  Today, although views on federalism have shifted,157 there
certainly remains some benefit to giving local communities input into
federal criminal law enforcement priorities.
If the grand jury did not comfort those Framers concerned about
use of federal criminal law as a tool for central government encroach-
ment on state and local prerogatives, it should have.  Indeed, the right
to indictment by grand jury was a topic of discussion among states
considering ratification of the Constitution partly because of fear of
the central government’s power.158  At the time of the Founding, the
grand jury was (and, at least in theory, it remains) a moderator of
criminal law federalism.  The grand jury’s robust discretion helps it
serve this structural role.
As this Part reveals, grand jury nullification is not only consistent
with the rule of law, but also buttresses the rule of law in important
ways.  The grand jury’s robust discretion did not result from historical
accident; it is in the grand jury’s DNA and helps it to perform its in-
tended role in the constitutional design.
156 Cf. Wenger & Hoffman, supra note 76, at 1153–56 (discussing how petit jury nullifi- R
cation can perform a communicative function). However, it must be conceded that there
are certain limits to the efficacy of this communicative function.  As discussed below, it can
be difficult to discern why a grand jury declined to indict in a given case.  Certain features
of the grand jury, such as secrecy restrictions and the lack of double jeopardy protection,
can hinder the actual dissemination of such a message beyond the prosecutors charged
with enforcing the law. See infra section III.B.4.  Furthermore, the lack of a requirement of
unanimity (twelve of the twenty-three grand jurors can derail an indictment) may frustrate
efforts to discern what, if anything, one can learn from a divided grand jury’s failure to
indict. See infra subpart III.B.
157 There are obvious dangers posed to a federal system when local grand juries are in
a position to nullify congressional statutes. See, e.g., United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408
F.3d 1184, 1203–04 (9th Cir. 2005).  Concerns arise when a local grand jury is in a position
to frustrate national enforcement priorities or even the protection of oppressed minorities
in local communities.  While the author shares those concerns, grand juries, by their de-
sign and very nature, do have that power, whether it is one we think, from a normative
standpoint, should be exercised in a given case.  Also, there are certain features of the
grand jury, such as the ability of prosecutors to obtain review by a subsequent grand jury,
that make grand jury nullification less worrisome than petit jury nullification in this regard.
See infra section III.B.1.
158 See CLARK, supra note 41, at 19–20 (“The federal Constitution’s provisions were R
adopted not only because the grand jury had a key role in the Revolution but also because
many colonists were fearful of creating a powerful central government that could arbitrar-
ily use the criminal process against its political enemies.”); YOUNGER, supra note 96, at R
45–46 (describing how ratifying conventions in Massachusetts, New York, and New Hamp-
shire recommended amendment to include a grand jury requirement, which became part
of the Fifth Amendment); Simmons, supra note 3, at 12 (“When the original Constitution R
made no provision for grand juries, eight of the thirteen original states recommended that
it be amended to ensure the right to a grand jury.”).
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III
OPTIMIZING THE EXERCISE OF DISCRETION IN
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Another primary critique claims that the grand jury possesses un-
warranted discretion relative to that of other actors in the criminal
justice system. To the contrary, the grand jury’s discretion is at least as
appropriate as the discretion afforded to other community justice ac-
tors.  Furthermore, the grand jury is well equipped—in contrast to the
petit jury and other discretion-wielding criminal justice actors—to ex-
ercise this sort of discretion.
A. Inventorying Discretion in Criminal Justice
Discretion is the backbone of the criminal justice system.  The
administration of criminal justice is not wooden and mechanical—
there are far too many criminal laws and far too many offenders for
society’s limited police, prosecutorial, judicial, and penological re-
sources.159  Therefore, actors in the criminal justice system must exer-
cise some discretion in deciding which individuals to arrest,
prosecute, convict, and punish.160  In order to map the contours and
relative advantages of the grand jury’s robust discretion, this subpart
briefly explains how discretion, though subject to statutory and consti-
tutional limits, undergirds the criminal justice process from beginning
to end.
1. Executive Criminal Enforcement Policymaking
The Executive exercises tremendous discretion in setting policy
regarding enforcement priorities.  This takes two forms.  First, the Ex-
ecutive may set policy on the criminalization of a certain type of con-
duct and work to persuade the Legislature to proscribe that conduct.
Second, the Executive—from both a law enforcement and a
prosecutorial standpoint—determines which criminal laws to en-
force.161  For instance, a presidential administration hostile to laissez-
faire approaches to market regulation might vigorously enforce anti-
159 George C. Thomas, III, Discretion and Criminal Law: The Good, the Bad, and the Mun-
dane, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1043 (2005) (stating that discretion in the criminal justice sys-
tem is inevitable but that socially unacceptable applications of this discretion may be
subject to constraint).
160 See ALLEN, supra note 67, at 57–77 (describing the fragmented and discretion-laden R
American criminal justice apparatus); Joseph B. Kadane, Sausages and the Law: Juror Deci-
sions in the Much Larger Justice System, in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECI-
SION MAKING 229, 230–31 (Reid Hastie ed., 1993) (outlining many decisions made
regarding a case progressing through the justice system in addition to those by jurors);
James Vorenberg, Narrowing the Discretion of Criminal Justice Officials, 1976 DUKE L.J. 651
(proposing reductions in the discretion of criminal justice officials).
161 See CONG. QUARTERLY INC., POWERS OF THE PRESIDENCY 61 (2d ed. 1997) (discussing
the President’s role “as [a] policy-maker[ ]” concerning law enforcement and noting that
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trust laws to the detriment of other enforcement priorities.  Likewise,
an Executive with a strong gun-control position might exercise discre-
tion to focus enforcement and prosecutorial resources on gun crimes.
2. Law Enforcement Discretion
Although investigating certain types of criminal activity involves
collaboration between law enforcement officials and prosecutors,
prosecutors will often be unaware of potentially criminal conduct un-
til law enforcement officials bring it to their attention after an investi-
gation is underway or even complete.  Law enforcement personnel,
therefore, exercise tremendous discretion to determine whether to in-
vestigate an individual or entity in the first place and, if they discover
criminal conduct, whether to bring it to the prosecutor for a charging
decision.162  Any criminal procedure hornbook recounts the discre-
tion law enforcement officers wield in determining who to stop and
frisk, question, or ask for consent to conduct more invasive searches.
Although the Constitution and statutes highly regulate the manner in
which law enforcement personnel conduct investigations,163 the deci-
sion to investigate an individual in the first instance is unchecked.164
Once law enforcement personnel have investigated a person of
interest, they must decide whether to detain and/or seek charges
against that person.165  This exercise of discretion has perhaps the
most profound impact on a putative defendant because it comes at
the point when the person will or will not be entered into the “sys-
tem.”166  Even where other actors exercise discretion later in the crim-
inal justice process in the individual’s favor, the stigma of the
investigation and arrest, many times memorialized in an arrest record,
can have lasting effects.  And while indications of possible criminal
conduct—enough to satisfy the probable cause standard—will often
the President determines “what types of offenses merit the greatest attention, what re-
sources will be allocated, and what cases will be prosecuted”).
162 See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 77, at 23–25; Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 R
FORDHAM L. REV. 1715 (2006) (arguing that discretion to not enforce the law sometimes is
used too frequently); Daniel Richman, Prosecutors and Their Agents, Agents and Their Prosecu-
tors, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 749 (2003) (examining dynamics of interaction between federal
prosecutors and law enforcement agents); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Crimi-
nal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 579–82 (2001) (considering prosecutorial and police
discretion).
163 Additionally, with respect to state law enforcement, prosecution, and trial, state
constitutions may provide greater protection than the U.S. Constitution. See Robert F. Ut-
ter, State Constitutional Law, The United States Supreme Court, and Democratic Accountability: Is
There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. REV. 19, 27 & n.54 (1989).
164 See generally Joseph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-
Visibility Decisions in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 543 (1960) (proposing oversight
of the discretion that police exercise).
165 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 159, at 1047–48. R
166 See, e.g., id. at 1048–49.
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determine whether law enforcement will present a case to a prosecu-
tor for a charging decision, other factors unrelated to the sufficiency
of the evidence might drive this discretion.  These factors include
whether the individual might be a valuable asset to other investigatory
activity, whether the individual is a prominent member of society,
whether litigating the case would expose unconstitutional officer con-
duct to scrutiny, whether the case would advance the career of the
investigating officer, and whether the case has received publicity.167
These and any number of other nonevidentiary factors, legitimate and
illegitimate, may guide the virtually unfettered and unreviewable dis-
cretion of law enforcement officials.
3. Prosecutorial Discretion
Perhaps the broadest exercise of discretion occurs at the crucial
charging stage.168  Prosecutors in individual cases exercise discretion
when deciding whether to charge a defendant in the first instance,169
and such discretion is virtually unfettered.170  The prosecutor can de-
cide whether to charge an individual on any number of grounds.
Often whether there is, or will likely be, enough admissible evidence
to obtain a conviction will factor prominently in the prosecutor’s deci-
sion to charge.  For example, the resolve of a whistleblower or com-
plaining witness, the credibility of the investigating law enforcement
officer, or the availability of documentary, forensic, or other physical
evidence will drive the prosecutor’s discretion.
However, prosecutors just as often will decide whether to charge
based on factors other than the sufficiency of the evidence.171  In ex-
167 See, e.g., ALLEN, supra note 67, at 66–70. R
168 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL
STUD. 289, 299–300 (1983); Kadane, supra note 160, at 234 (“If I had to single out one R
decision as the most important in the entire system I would point to the decision made by
prosecutors fairly early in the sequence about whether or not to prosecute at all.”); Wein-
stein, supra note 56, at 246 (“By far the greatest nullification takes place as a result of R
decisions not to prosecute or reduce charges.”).
169 See, e.g., Donald A. Dripps, Overcriminalization, Discretion, Waiver: A Survey of Possible
Exit Strategies, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1155, 1175–76 (2005); L.B. Schwartz, Federal Criminal
Jurisdiction and Prosecutors’ Discretion, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 64, 83 (1948); Ronald
Wright & Marc Miller, Honesty and Opacity in Charge Bargains, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1409,
1410–13 (2003).
170 See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996); Bordenkircher v.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 368 n.2 (1978); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974)
(describing the Executive’s “exclusive authority and absolute discretion to decide whether
to prosecute a case”); KENNETH C. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 189–214 (1969); Voren-
berg, supra note 160, at 678 (“The prosecutor’s decision whether and what to charge is the R
broadest discretionary power in criminal administration.”).
171 See, e.g., United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1213 (9th Cir. 2005) (Haw-
kins, J., dissenting); United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 367 F.3d 896, 900–02 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting), vacated en banc, 382 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2004); United States v.
Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 171 (5th Cir. 1965) (“The discretionary power of the attorney for the
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ercising discretion whether to charge a defendant, a prosecutor might
ask a host of nonevidentiary questions including whether the defen-
dant is a recidivist or is likely to offend again, whether the prosecutor
has a heavy caseload at the time, whether the type of case is career
advancing, whether the case has received publicity, whether the victim
is vocal and empowered, whether the investigating law enforcement
agency is pleasant to work with, whether the case has jury appeal,
whether a matter is more appropriately prosecuted by a different sov-
ereign or handled as a civil matter, and whether the criminal conduct
is a priority area for the prosecutor’s superiors.  While some of these
bases seem more legitimate than others,172 all are typical grounds for
prosecutors’ exercise of their unfettered charging discretion.173
Beyond that initial decision whether to charge, prosecutors make
many other important discretionary judgments.174  Obviously, where a
defendant’s conduct implicates multiple criminal statutes, a prosecu-
tor must decide which crimes to charge.175  And once the prosecutor
United States in determining whether a prosecution shall be commenced or maintained
may well depend upon matters of policy wholly apart from any question of probable
cause.”); Thomas, supra note 159, at 1044–45; see also FRANK W. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE R
DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A CRIME 154–280 (1969) (discussing various nonevi-
dentiary bases for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion); Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecu-
tor’s Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. L. 532, 533–35 (1970) (same).  One
commentator has considered a “mechanism for tying the exercise of prosecutorial discre-
tion to the availability of prison resources.” See Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial
Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 720 (1996).
172 See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR
33–39 (2007) (discussing possible differences in how prosecutors decide whether to
charge); Sandra Caron George, Note, Prosecutorial Discretion: What’s Politics Got to Do With
It?, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 751–56 (2005) (discussing the role of politics in
prosecutorial discretion).
173 The U.S. Department of Justice has internal guidelines to guide the discretion of
federal prosecutors. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, § 9-
27.000 (1997) [hereinafter U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL].  However, the guidelines make clear
that their existence creates no right of action or review in any external party or entity. See
id. § 9-27.150; see also Ellen S. Podgor, Department of Justice Guidelines: Balancing “Discretionary
Justice,” 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 167 (2004) (advocating reforms designed to enhance
compliane with internal guidelines).  An additional check on prosecutorial discretion is
found in the Hyde Amendment, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (2000), which extends a cause of action
to a prevailing criminal defendant for “a reasonable attorney’s fee and other litigation
expenses, where the court finds that the position of the United States was vexatious, frivo-
lous, or in bad faith.”  Pub. L. No. 105-119, tit. VI, § 617, 111 Stat. 2440, 2519 (1997)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3006A); see also Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congres-
sional Delegation, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757 (1999) (considering legis-
lative control of prosecutorial discretion).
174 See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 77, at 89–92; Andrew Horwitz, Taking the Cop Out of R
Copping a Plea: Eradicating Police Prosecution of Criminal Cases, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 1305, 1307
(1998).
175 See, e.g., United States v. Batchelder, 442 U.S. 114, 123–24 (1979) (“[W]hen an act
violates more than one criminal statute, the Government may prosecute under either so
long as it does not discriminate against any class of defendants.”); Cahill, supra note 72, at R
118.  Indeed, prosecutors may “nullify” a criminal statute by refusing to enforce it. See
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charges the defendant with those crimes, it is within the discretion of
the prosecutor to decide whether to dismiss some or all of the charges
previously lodged.176  As with the decision to charge, each of these
later prosecutorial decisions is marked by discretion that is, in most
instances, unreviewable.177
4. Petit Jury Discretion
As discussed above, the petit jury in a criminal case is tasked with
determining whether the government has proven each element of the
crimes charged beyond a reasonable doubt, but also has the power to
acquit on bases other than the sufficiency of the evidence.178  Several
features of this power bear repeating.  Although judges instruct petit
juries on the law and acting contrary to such instruction is generally
disfavored, there are effectively no controls on a petit jury’s ability to
exercise its discretion on bases beyond sufficiency of the evidence.179
Therefore, even where the government has presented evidence estab-
lishing the defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, a petit jury
can nevertheless use its discretion to acquit.180  Petit juries, like grand
juries, can exercise this discretion for virtually any reason at all, from
disagreement with the wisdom or fairness of the criminal statute to
bias toward the accused or hatred of the victim.181  Also, a sole mem-
ber of a petit jury can frustrate a prosecution, as the federal system
and most states require unanimity for conviction.182  Most impor-
generally Arthur E. Bonfield, The Abrogation of Penal Statutes by Nonenforcement, 49 IOWA L.
REV. 389 (describing the “nullification by nonenforcement” phenomenon).
176 Dismissal of charges before trial can result from an assessment of the strength (or
weakness) of evidence in a case, a decision to allow some sort of pretrial diversion of the
defendant, see, e.g., Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court
Movement, 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1255 (1998), or a determination that the government
should agree to a plea bargain. See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 173, § 9-27.400. R
177 See, e.g., James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L. REV.
1521, 1523 (1981). But see MILLER, supra note 171, at 5 (describing prosecutorial discretion R
as “nearly uncontrolled” save for “the fact that the prosecutor is typically an elected official
and thus responsive to community opinion”).
178 See supra subpart I.A.
179 See generally Rene´e B. Lettow, New Trial for Verdict Against Law: Judge-Jury Relations in
Early Nineteenth-Century America, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 505 (1996) (examining increased
judicial control over civil juries in early nineteenth-century America).
180 See State v. Ragland, 519 A.2d 1361, 1372 (N.J. 1986) (declaring that “[j]ury nullifi-
cation is an unfortunate but unavoidable power”).
181 See Brown, supra note 4, at 1171–96; Marder, supra note 32, at 887–902; see also R
Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1467, 1485 & n.68
(2001) (noting that petit juries might choose “to convict of a lesser offense despite clear
proof of guilt on a higher offense,” a practice Blackstone referred to as “‘pious perjury’”
(quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *238–39 (1769))); supra text accompany-
ing note 32. R
182 See FED. R. CRIM P. 31(a) (mandating that in a federal criminal jury trial, “[t]he
verdict must be unanimous”); Leib, supra note 16, at 141–42.  Although the Constitution R
does not require unanimity, see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 406 (1972), most states
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tantly, because the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits retrial following
acquittal,183 the petit jury can forever shield a defendant from liability
for an alleged crime.184  The petit jury’s discretion in this regard is
unfettered and unreviewable.
5. Judicial Discretion
Judicial officers—magistrate judges, trial judges, and sentencing
judges—also exercise significant discretion in the criminal justice pro-
cess.  Although the discretion of judicial officers based on noneviden-
tiary bases is, in many ways, much more constrained than that of law
enforcement officers, prosecutors, and petit juries, some characteris-
tics of judicial discretion deserve mention.
Magistrate judges must decide whether the government has
presented sufficient evidence for probable cause to support an arrest
warrant and for charges to proceed.185  In cases not requiring grand
jury indictment,186 this may be the only determination regarding the
sufficiency of the evidence prior to the fact finder at trial reaching a
verdict of conviction or acquittal.  Although the law explicitly charges
magistrate judges with determining whether the government has
presented evidence sufficient to satisfy probable cause,187 magistrate
judges can ground such findings on bases other than the sufficiency
of the evidence.  Perhaps a magistrate judge doubts the credibility of
the investigating officer or the prosecutor even though the magistrate
judge has no specific knowledge of misconduct in the case at bar.  The
magistrate judge can simply find that the government has not met its
burden of probable cause.  Or a magistrate judge could dismiss
charges because of disagreement with the enforcement priorities of
the law enforcement agency or prosecutor’s office, or belief that the
particular defendant should not be prosecuted for reasons unrelated
do require unanimous verdicts in criminal cases. See, e.g., JAMES Q. WHITMAN, THE ORIGINS
OF REASONABLE DOUBT: THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF THE CRIMINAL TRIAL 22 (2008); Edward P.
Schwartz & Warren F. Schwartz, And So Say Some of Us . . . What To Do When Jurors Disagree, 9
S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 429, 429 (2000).
183 See, e.g., Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 466–67 (2005).
184 Of course, pursuant to the “dual sovereignty” doctrine, a second sovereign may
bring a successive prosecution for acquitted conduct. See, e.g., Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S.
121, 132–34 (1959).  However, the U.S. Department of Justice has internal guidelines,
commonly referred to as the “Petite Policy,” to guide federal prosecutorial discretion with
regard to the decision to initiate a prosecution for conduct previously prosecuted under
the law of another sovereign. See, e.g., Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 27–29 (1977);
U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 173, § 9-2.031 (discussing the policy on dual and R
successive prosecution).
185 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 3, 4, 5.1, 41.
186 In capital and other felony cases, where the Grand Jury Clause requires indictment,
the magistrate judge often may be called upon to make a probable cause determination
should the grand jury not issue an indictment within a certain time frame. See, e.g., id. 5.1.
187 See id. 5.1(e).
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to the quality and quantity of the evidence.  To be sure, the prosecu-
tor has some recourse and can simply present the case to another judi-
cial officer or seek an indictment from a grand jury to obviate the
need for the judicial officer’s finding.188  Prosecutors are often loathe
to resort to these techniques, however.  They are often repeat players
before magistrate judges and may wish to avoid sidestepping their au-
thority out of fear of alienating them.189
Arguably, trial judges sitting as fact finders in bench trials have
the same power to nullify that petit juries have.190  In fact, because
trial judges have such broad experience across numerous cases in
both fact-finding and sentencing roles, they may perceive themselves
as better equipped to make “just” decisions on bases beyond suffi-
ciency of the evidence.191  Even a trial judge presiding over a jury trial
has the discretion to grant a motion for judgment of acquittal or enter
judgment of acquittal sua sponte.192  While such “directed verdicts” are
supposed to be based solely on the quantum of evidence presented by
the government, a judge could acquit a defendant on one or all
charges on bases other than the sufficiency of the evidence.  A judge
who acquits a defendant during a bench trial or enters a judgment of
acquittal in a jury trial exercises unfettered and unreviewable discre-
tion193 because of the strictures of the Double Jeopardy Clause.194
188 See id. 5.1.
189 Cf. George R. Nock, The Point of the Fourth Amendment and the Myth of Magisterial
Discretion, 23 CONN. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (1990) (considering the highly regarded position of
magistrate judges).  Setting bail and concomitant conditions of release is also highly discre-
tionary, even within the “guided discretion” framework erected by many bail reform stat-
utes of the latter half of the twentieth century. See WALKER, supra note 77, at 54–80; R
HOWARD ABADINSKY, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION TO DISCRETION IN THE CRIM-
INAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 65–66 (1984).
190 See, e.g., Paul Butler, When Judges Lie (and When They Should), 91 MINN. L. REV. 1785,
1785–87 (2007); M.B.E. Smith, May Judges Ever Nullify the Law?, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1657, 1661 (1999).
191 See, e.g., Leipold, supra note 16, at 200–18 (evaluating the hypothesis that judges R
may acquit more frequently when faced with having to impose severe sentences compelled
by strict sentencing guidelines regimes).  However, as Professor Robinson points out, there
are barriers associated with the socioeconomic and educational background and institu-
tional role of most judges that may make them less well equipped to make such normative
judgments. See Paul H. Robinson, Legality and Discretion in the Distribution of Criminal Sanc-
tions, 25 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 416–419 (1988).
192 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a).
193 See Leipold, supra note 16.  Indeed, a proposed amendment to the Federal Rules of R
Criminal Procedure is designed to rein in this discretion. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 29 (Proposed
Amendments 2006), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Excerpt_CR_Report_Pub.
July%202006.pdf#page=7 (permitting government appeal of preverdict judgments of
acquittal).
194 See Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 466–67 (2005). Generally, the government
cannot appeal a judgment of acquittal entered by a trial judge.  The only exception is when
the trial judge enters a judgment of acquittal after a jury has voted to convict.  In that
instance, the government can appeal the judgment of acquittal. See id. at 467.
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Furthermore, the sentencing judge has an obvious discretionary
role to play.195  Although the legislatively prescribed limits of punish-
ment cabin this discretion, sentencing discretion has, for much of the
nation’s history, given judges broad latitude to determine
sentences.196  Indeed, the perceived unfairness of the broad discre-
tion inherent in indeterminate sentencing was an impetus for the pro-
mulgation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines in the 1980s.197  Now
that the Supreme Court has rendered those guidelines advisory,198
judges have regained discretion to sentence convicted criminal de-
fendants within statutory confines.199
195 See WALKER, supra note 77, at 117–18; Easterbrook, supra note 168, at 322–25.  In R
addition to the initial sentencing decision, judges in the federal and some state systems
have discretion to revisit the imposed sentence after a period of time. See, e.g., FED. R.
CRIM. P. 35(b)(1) (allowing judges to modify a sentence for a defendant’s “substantial
assistance” with other criminal investigations); MD. R. § 4-345 (allowing court to reduce a
sentence within a set period of time).
196 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 168, at 322–25 (arguing, prior to the promulgation R
of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, that “[t]here is as much discretion in sentencing as
anywhere else in criminal procedure”); Joseph E. Kennedy, Making the Crime Fit the Punish-
ment, 51 EMORY L.J. 753, 758–59 (2002) (noting the pre-Guidelines sentencing discretion
of federal trial judges); see also WALKER, supra note 77, at 112–17; Robinson, supra note 191, R
at 404 (1988) (noting that even within guidelines sentencing regimes, “[s]entencing
judges, who are accustomed to nearly absolute sentencing discretion, may attempt to sub-
vert guidelines sentences that they believe are improper”); Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The
Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 223, 225–26 (1993).
197 See, e.g., Laura I. Appleman, Retributive Justice and Hidden Sentencing, 68 OHIO ST. L.J.
1307, 1348–49 (2007); Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion in Criminal
Sentencing, 39 VAL. U. L. REV. 693, 699 (2005); Cynthia Kwei Yung Lee, Prosecutorial Discre-
tion, Substantial Assistance, and the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 UCLA L. REV. 105, 107
(1994); see also MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5 (1973)
(noting that “the almost wholly unchecked and sweeping powers we give to judges in the
fashioning of sentences are terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes devotion
to the rule of law”); Lisa M. Fairfax, Trust, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and Lessons From
Fiduciary Law, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 1025, 1056 n.220 (2002).
198 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 233–34 (2005) (rendering the federal
Sentencing Guidelines advisory due to their incompatibility with the Sixth Amendment
right to jury trial); see also Frank O. Bowman, III, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1316–17 (2005).
199 Shortly after Booker, it remained to be seen how much discretion the Supreme
Court had returned to sentencing judges, as sentences still were subject to appellate review
for “reasonableness.” See, e.g., Nancy J. King, Reasonableness Review After Booker, 43 HOUS.
L. REV. 325, 325–26 (2006) (accounting for sentences that fall within or without the Guide-
lines range).  In 2007, the Court, in what fairly can be characterized as two landmark deci-
sions, made clear that district judges indeed enjoyed much greater sentencing discretion
after Booker. See Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007) (holding that appellate
courts must apply more deferential abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing sentences
for reasonableness, whether or nor the sentence is within the advisory Guidelines range);
Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 574 (2007) (holding that the crack versus
powder cocaine disparity contained in the advisory Guidelines is not mandatory and rea-
sonably may be considered by the judge when fashioning an out-of-Guidelines sentence);
Kate Stith, Arc of the Pendulum: The Exercise of Discretion in Sentencing, 117 YALE L.J. (forth-
coming 2008); Linda Greenhouse, Justices Restore Judges’ Control over Sentencing, N.Y. TIMES,
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6. Executive Mercy Discretion
Finally, the Executive also exercises unchecked discretion
through its clemency and pardon power.  Parole boards, often ap-
pointed by (and loyal to) the Executive, possess broad discretion to
shorten the sentences of convicted defendants.200  Executive clemency
is perhaps the starkest example of absolute discretion in the criminal
justice process.  In the federal system and in many states, the Execu-
tive has the unconditional power to commute the sentence of a crimi-
nal defendant—even one condemned to death.201  When deciding
whether to pardon a defendant or grant clemency, the executive
branch often relies on recommendations of a formal commission or
informal advisors,202 and decides on a careful weighing of factors such
as evidence of the defendant’s redemption, views of the victim or the
victim’s family, and the public interest.203  Pardons often come with
strings attached and require the pardoned individual to comply with
certain conditions.204  However, the decision to pardon, entrusted to
the President by Article II in the federal system,205 can be made for
any reason at all.206  Although the Executive’s decision to exercise (or
not exercise) the pardon and clemency powers often encounter great
Dec. 11, 2007, at A1.  Coincedentally, the day after the decisions came down, the U.S.
Sentencing Commission voted unanimously to give retroactive effect to a recent amend-
ment to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines reducing the sanction for crack cocaine of-
fenses. See Press Release, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, U.S. Sentencing Comm’n Votes
Unanimously to Apply Amendment Retroactively for Crack Cocaine Offenses (Dec. 11,
2007), available at http://www.ussc.gov/PRESS/rel121107.htm; Daryll Fears, Panel May Cut
Sentences for Crack—Thousands Could Be Released Early, WASH. POST, Nov. 13, 2007, at A1.
200 See, e.g., Victoria J. Palacios, Go and Sin No More: Rationality and Release Decisions by
Parole Boards, 45 S.C. L. REV. 567, 567–68 (1994).
201 See, e.g., Samuel T. Morison, The Politics of Grace: On the Moral Justification of Executive
Clemency, 9 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 14 (2005); Mark Strasser, Some Reflections on the President’s
Pardon Power, 31 CAP. U. L. REV. 143, 143–45 (2003).
202 See Palacios, supra note 200, at 568. R
203 See White v. Ind. Parole Bd., 266 F.3d 759, 766 (7th Cir. 2001); Palacios, supra note
200, at 568, 578–80.  Considerations of mercy may also play a part in the executive clem- R
ency decision. See, e.g., Daniel T. Kobil, Should Mercy Have a Place in Clemency Decisions?, in
FORGIVENESS, MERCY, AND CLEMENCY 36, 39–45 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds., 2007)
(considering the appropriateness of mercy as a basis for executive clemency); Barkow,
supra note 51, (manuscript at 14–15) (arguing that the rise of administrative law is detri- R
mental to the executive prerogative to grant mercy through the clemency function).
204 See Harold J. Krent, Conditioning the President’s Conditional Pardon Power, 89 CAL. L.
REV. 1665, 1676–79 (2001).
205 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; Todd D. Peterson, Congressional Power Over Pardon and
Amnesty: Legislative Authority in the Shadow of Presidential Prerogative, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1225, 1226 (2003) (stating that the Pardon Clause in the Constitution is “often described
as an example of an unconfined constitutional grant of authority”).
206 See, e.g., Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120–21 (1925); Strasser, supra note 201, at R
144.
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controversy,207 this exercise of discretion cannot be reviewed or
overturned.208
A close look at the discretion that the criminal justice system af-
fords to other actors reveals that the grand jury’s robust discretion is
not unusual.209  In many ways, the grand jury’s discretion is no greater
than that of the law enforcement officer, the prosecutor, or the
judge.210  Many of these other criminal justice actors are empowered
to make dispositive decisions based on considerations beyond a bare
sufficiency of the evidence analysis.211  As noted above, various nonevi-
dentiary considerations may compel a certain decision when actors
exercise discretion at other points during the criminal justice pro-
cess.212  Although one may find greater comfort, for instance, in exer-
cises of discretion by law enforcement and prosecutors than in the
dispositive discretionary choices made by fact-finding judges and ju-
ries, the fact remains that significant discretion is a common and inte-
gral feature of the entire criminal justice process.
Furthermore, many of these dispositive exercises of discretion are
completely unreviewable or at least not reviewable in any meaningful
sense.  Attempts to review petit jury acquittals, judicial acquittals, and
executive pardons are futile; the Constitution, by operation of the
Double Jeopardy Clause and the pardon power, renders these deci-
207 See, e.g., Leonard B. Boudin, The Presidential Pardons of James R. Hoffa and Richard M.
Nixon: Have the Limitations on the Pardon Power Been Exceeded?, 48 U. COLO. L. REV. 1, 1–2
(1976).
208 See King, supra note 143, at 455 & nn. 95–96; Markel, supra note 42, at 1458. R
209 See, e.g., ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CLEVELAND 569 (1922) (placing the
“power of the grand jury to ignore the charge” among all the other discretionary judg-
ments made throughout the criminal process).
210 See, e.g., United States v. Asdrubal-Herrera, 470 F. Supp. 939, 942 (N.D. Ill. 1979)
(“Just as a prosecutor can, in the exercise of discretion, decline prosecution in the first
instance, a grand jury can return a true bill or a no bill as they deem fit.”); Robert T. Hall,
Legal Tolerance of Civil Disobedience, 81 ETHICS 128, 132–35 (1971) (discussing the different
forms of discretion for law officers, prosecutors, and judges); Thomas, supra note 159, at R
1044–45 (discussing the broad discretion of police officers and prosecutors); Weinstein,
supra note 56, at 246–47 (“Compared to prosecutorial nullification, grand jury refusal to R
indict . . . [is] of minor significance.”).
211 Cf. Brown, supra note 4, at 1189–90.  As Professor Brown explains in the context of R
petit jury nullification:
We fully accept that prosecutors have discretion to apply criminal law or
not according to their own judgment, into which they are readily allowed to
consider moral or social policy factors well beyond the facts’ relation to the
statutory elements.  Rare is the contention that prosecutorial discretion is
“lawless,” as opposed to merely ill-advised.  Yet a jury making essentially the
same judgment—thus double-checking the prosecutor’s choice by deciding
whether it finds compelling reasons to nullify rather than endorse the pros-
ecutor’s application of law—faces the traditional objections of bias, irra-
tionality, or subversion of the democratic process.
Id.
212 See supra notes 202–03. R
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sions unreviewable.213  Also, while the Executive answers to the citi-
zenry through the ballot, the structure of the professional civil service
means that career law enforcement agents and prosecutors exercise
most on-the-ground discretion.214  Even considering the setting of
broad criminal justice policy, which is more likely to bear the strong
imprint of elected decision makers sensitive to political consequences,
the nature of the democratic process may not lend itself to meaning-
ful policy dialogue between those in power and the populace.215
And even where review is theoretically available within the judi-
cial process, as with pretrial probable cause determinations216 and
sentencing decisions,217 barriers to review often exist in all but the
most extraordinary cases.  When appeals are available, they are often
slow and require great resources—sometimes more than government
actors are willing to devote.  As mentioned above, law enforcement
investigatory and prosecutorial charging decisions are largely unregu-
lated, as well.218  Although the Fourth Amendment and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause provide some parameters for this discretion, numerous
hurdles exist.  For example, the Supreme Court has been fairly rigid
and formalistic in responding to attempts to limit discretion with re-
gard to racial profiling.219  Even where the source of a remedy for an
unconstitutional exercise of discretion clearly exists, it is difficult to
achieve redress.  Equal protection challenges to exercises of
prosecutorial and investigatory discretion are notoriously difficult to
bring and to prove; many would consider even gaining access to dis-
213 See Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 466–67 (2005) (holding that the Double
Jeopardy Clause “prohibits reexamination of a court-decreed acquittal to the same extent it
prohibits reexamination of an acquittal by a jury verdict”); Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dum-
schat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981) (“[P]ardon and commutation decisions have not tradition-
ally been the business of courts; as such, they are rarely, if ever, appropriate subjects for
judicial review.”).
214 See Goldstein, supra note 164, at 178 (“Police decisions not to invoke the criminal R
process largely determine the outer limits of law enforcement.”). But see Bruce A. Green &
Fred C. Zacharias, “The U.S. Attorneys Scandal” and the Allocation of Prosecutorial Power, 69
OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2008) (manuscript at 6–7), available at http://ssrn.com/ab-
stract=1015026 (discussing control of subordinate career prosecutors by political superi-
ors).  It should be noted, as Professor Fiss reminds, that although United States Attorneys
are appointed by the President, they typically are put forward by the home-state Senators,
who are elected at the state level. Therefore, the United States Attorneys “are very respon-
sive to local politics.” FISS, supra note 48, at 137. R
215 See, e.g., SPENCER OVERTON, STEALING DEMOCRACY: THE NEW POLITICS OF VOTER SUP-
PRESSION 43–64 (2006) (discussing obstacles to full and fair democracy in the United
States).
216 FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1.
217 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35.
218 See supra sections III.A.2, III.A.3.
219 See, e.g., Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 816–18 (1996); see also Russell L.
Weaver, Investigation and Discretion: The Terry Revolution at Forty (Almost), 109 PENN ST. L.
REV. 1205, 1214–15 (2005).
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covery a victory.220  Furthermore, tort actions against decision makers
are often futile in the face of high litigation costs, discovery restric-
tions, and qualified or absolute immunity.221
B. The Grand Jury as a Locus of Robust Discretion
Therefore, many dispositive exercises of discretion by criminal jus-
tice actors are or can be based on considerations other than the suffi-
ciency of the evidence.  Furthermore, these exercises of robust
discretion are not reviewed and, in some cases, cannot be reviewed.
Given the amount of unchecked discretion that other actors in the
criminal justice system enjoy, query whether we should be concerned
about the grand jury exercising such discretion.  Indeed, in many ways
the grand jury is the best equipped of all the criminal justice actors to
exercise such discretion.
1. Safety Valve
First, an important feature attendant to the grand jury’s robust
discretion is that grand jury decisions, unlike those of the petit jury,
do not enjoy Double Jeopardy Clause protection.  Generally, a grand
jury’s decision not to indict a potential defendant is not dispositive.222
Assuming there are no statute of limitations concerns,223 the prosecu-
tor can simply present the case to another grand jury and attempt to
obtain an indictment.224  While prosecuting agencies may self-regulate
their abilities to present cases to successive grand juries,225 no consti-
tutional provision prohibits such actions.226
One cannot overstate the importance of the fact that a subse-
quent grand jury may review a prior grand jury’s decision to decline
indictment.  Whether a grand jury acts from an improper motive or
simply frustrates a law enforcement priority, the grand jury’s nullifica-
220 See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463–64 (1996); Angela J. Davis,
Prosecution and Race: The Power and Privilege of Discretion, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 13, 18 (1998).
221 See, e.g., Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 273 (1993) (holding that prosecutors
enjoy absolute immunity surrounding charging decisions).
222 See, e.g., 2 BEALE ET AL., supra note 1, § 8:6 (2005 & Supp. 2007); GEORGE J. ED- R
WARDS, JR., THE GRAND JURY 42 (1906) (“[I]f the grand jury improperly reject a bill, it is still
competent for the district attorney to lay the matter before a subsequent grand jury, which
may act otherwise.  The ability of the grand jurors to work harm by the abuse of their
power is, therefore, more fancied than real.”).
223 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (2000) (“[N]o person shall be prosecuted, tried, or pun-
ished for any offense, not capital, unless the indictment is found . . . within five years next
after such offense shall have been committed.”).
224 See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 49 (1992) (“The Double Jeopardy Clause
of the Fifth Amendment does not bar a grand jury from returning an indictment when a
prior grand jury has refused to do so.”).
225 See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 173, § 9-11.120(A) (requiring approval by R
a United States Attorney before resubmission of the matter to a new grand jury).
226 See Williams, 504 U.S. at 49.
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tion may send a message to the government but does not permanently
block a prosecution.227  This represents a significant difference from
the petit jury’s nullification power because the Double Jeopardy
Clause shields an accused individual from criminal liability for the al-
leged conduct forever.228  Therefore, the grand jury features a con-
comitant safety valve to protect against gross abuse of its discretion.
2. Enhanced Deliberation of the Grand Jury
Also, the grand jury’s unique characteristics may offer higher
quality deliberation than that of other actors in the criminal justice
system.  Because the grand jury sits for an extended period of time
and has no oversight of its pace of decision making, it does not have
the time pressures that other criminal justice actors face.229  A law en-
forcement agency may respond to public pressure to quickly appre-
hend an individual, and a prosecutor may feel the need to charge a
suspect promptly.  Executive clemency and pardon decisions often oc-
cur in the last days of a chief executive’s term, amidst a whirlwind of
other activity.230  Even a petit jury knows that the court and the parties
are waiting for a verdict; a court often will interpret extended jury
deliberations as a sign of futility or deadlock.231  In contrast, the grand
jury may deliberate on the merits of the prosecution for as long as it
desires—limited only, perhaps, by the prosecutor’s patience232 or the
expiration of the grand jury’s term.233  This lack of pressured, heat-of-
the-moment decision making may enhance the quality of the grand
jury’s deliberation.234
227 As discussed below, the fact that a prosecutor may press ahead with a prosecution
through another grand jury may somewhat dilute the grand jury’s communicative ability.
See infra Part III.
228 See, e.g., Smith v. Massachusetts, 543 U.S. 462, 466–67 (2005). But see Leipold,
supra note 57, at 259 (arguing for “error-correcting procedures” in jury trials, including a R
right of appeal from acquittals).
229 See 1 BEALE ET AL., supra note 1,  § 4:12. R
230 See Gregory C. Sisk, Suspending the Pardon Power During the Twilight of a Presidential
Term, 67 MO. L. REV. 13, 16, 21 (2002).
231 See, e.g., Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896) (endorsing a charge to a
deadlocked jury designed to prompt resolution of deliberations).
232 See 1 BEALE ET AL., supra note 1, § 4:12.  Of course, the prosecutor does have consid- R
erable influence by regulating the pace at which the grand jury hears the evidence. See id.
233 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(g).  Even when a grand jury’s term expires, the prosecutor
may present the matter to a new grand jury.  One can find a recent example of this in the
empanelment of a successor grand jury believed to be investigating circumstances sur-
rounding baseball great Barry Bonds after the first grand jury’s term expired in July 2006
amidst much anticipation. See Dave Sheinin, A New Grand Jury Impaneled for Bonds, WASH.
POST, July 21, 2006, at E5.  The government empaneled a successor grand jury to continue
the investigation. See id.
234 Of course, this is not to say that a grand jury may not be cognizant of the same
public pressures that bear on other criminal justice actors. See CLARK, supra note 41, at 23. R
(“The grand juries in more recent times have continued to reflect responsiveness to . . .
executive pressure that labels one or another group as . . . deserving of indictment.”).
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Closely related to the luxury of time is the fact that grand jurors
work together for a significant period, in some instances twenty-four
months.235  Unlike petit juries, which join together for one discrete
case and then disband, grand juries meet consistently for an extended
period of time.236  This contact certainly generates synergies and fa-
miliarity that can enhance the decision-making process.237  When ju-
rors spend more time together, they may create an environment in
which the deliberating grand jury recognizes and considers each ju-
ror’s unique perspective.238  Unlike most discretion-wielding actors in
the criminal process, grand juries are drawn from the citizenry and
represent the voice of the community.239  Furthermore, the grand
jury, which is roughly twice the size of the traditional petit jury,240
might benefit more from the cross-sectional ideal of deliberative juries
than does the trial jury.241
Grand jurors considering an indictment associated with a notorious criminal act, such as
the killing of a child or terrorist activity, may feel the same compulsion of expediency that
other actors who usually operate under more substantial and direct time constraints also
feel.
235 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(g).
236 See 1 BEALE ET AL., supra note 1, § 4:12. R
237 See Robinson, supra note 191, at 416 (noting that the fact that petit juries sit for R
only one case and then disband is an obstacle to “consistently applying abstract, normative
standards”).
238 See Brenner, supra note 30, at 81 (“The frequency with which grand juries are con- R
vened carries implications for . . . enhanced community voice.”).
239 See, e.g., id.
240 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(a)(1).
241 See, e.g., JOHN GUINTHER, THE JURY IN AMERICA 89–95 (1988) (surveying empirical
studies concerning sources of trial jury bias); Jeffrey Abramson, Two Ideals of Jury Delibera-
tion, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 125, 125 (referencing the jury as an institution often considered
to “embod[y] the ideal of using collective reasoned discussion to attain a common ver-
dict”); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 49, at 360–61 (1999) (discussing benefits of representative R
juries); Jason Mazzone, The Justice and the Jury, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 35, 59 (2006) (querying
whether larger juries might bring about a net gain in “participatory” benefits); cf. Ballew v.
Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978) (reviewing scholarly studies on petit jury size); GUINTHER,
supra, at 76 (describing criticism that smaller petit juries are “less representative of the
community”). But see GUINTHER, supra, at 78–79 (noting research suggesting that smaller
juries have smoother and more cordial deliberations). Even with the larger number of
jurors, however, there may be a concern that a grand jury may not be sufficiently represen-
tative to claim to be the voice of the community. See Jon Van Dyke, The Grand Jury: Represen-
tative or Elite?, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 37, 41–44 (1976) (discussing potential grand jury
manipulation).  Historically, society has considered the grand jury an elite body of (usu-
ally) men, chosen by a “key man” who recommended each grand juror for service. See
JEFFREY ABRAMSON, WE, THE JURY: THE JURY SYSTEM AND THE IDEAL OF DEMOCRACY 99–100
(Harvard Univ. Press 2000) (1994).  Although reforms have abolished such a system, see 28
U.S.C. § 1861 (2000), questions remain as to whether practical impediments stand in the
way of true cross-representation in the grand jury.  For example, the length of time that
many grand juries must serve—eighteen months—conceivably could limit the demo-
graphic group from which grand jurors are drawn; even though grand juries meet only a
few days each month, missed workdays may have a harsher impact on those lower on the
economic scale.  Also, the fact that grand jurors are drawn from far-ranging geographic
areas means that they do not represent a “community” in any meaningful sense. See gener-
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3. Enhanced Access and Exposure to Information
Another benefit of grand juries’ extended service relates not to its
length of service but rather to its volume of cases.  While there are
grand juries essentially dedicated to the investigation of a single cate-
gory of alleged criminal conduct or to the investigation of a single
individual or entity, most grand juries gain exposure to a wide array of
criminal cases during a term of service.242  Because grand juries are
repeat players, they may obtain a broad sense of important issues, in-
cluding the government’s enforcement priorities, the characteristics
of a sample of the individuals whom the prosecutor refers for indict-
ment, and the prosecutor’s charging decisions over a large group of
cases.243  In this way, the grand jury, unlike the petit jury, is well posi-
tioned to see the big picture regarding criminal justice policy in a
particular jurisdiction and to factor that policy into its decision mak-
ing in a more informed manner.244
The grand jury also enjoys access to a broader swath of evidence
than do most other criminal justice actors.245  One of the criticisms of
petit jury nullification claims is that evidentiary rules deny jurors ac-
cess to all of the information that a reasoned nullification decision
requires.246  However, as the Supreme Court famously recounted, the
grand jury, on behalf of the public, “has a right to every man’s evi-
ally Washburn, supra note 49 (proposing “neighborhood grand juries” to enhance the R
grand jury’s representative nature and effectiveness).  Additionally, the fact that the grand
jury does not require unanimity may work against the notion that the decision not to indict
in a given case expresses the community’s voice. Cf. JAMES WILSON, Of Juries, in THE WORKS
OF JAMES WILSON, 162, 205 (James DeWitt Andrews ed., 1896) (arguing that unanimity is
central to the jury’s authority as the delegate of the broader community).  Because twelve
grand jurors can block the other eleven from returning an indictment, a grand jury can
nullify although the panel is virtually evenly divided, a concern not typically present in the
context of petit jury nullification via acquittal.  For insightful treatment of the petit jury
unanimity rule from historical-analysis, theological, and democratic-theory perspectives,
see WHITMAN, supra note 182, at 22–23, 204 (reconsidering origins of the factual proof R
function of a unanimity rule); Richard A. Primus, When Democracy Is Not Self-Government:
Toward a Defense of the Unanimity Rule for Criminal Juries, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1417 (1997)
(mapping the implications of “interest-based” and “deliberative” democratic theories re-
lated to the unanimity rule and the jury’s democratic role).
242 See Brenner, supra note 30, at 81–82, 90–91 & n.119. R
243 See id. But see Easterbrook, supra note 168, at 308 (asserting that grand jurors “lack R
the information needed to make intelligent comparative decisions about who should be
prosecuted”).
244 See Brenner, supra note 30, at 90–91 (asserting that grand jury term lengths create R
an “independent existence [that] enhances a grand jury’s ability to serve as a voice of the
community and to distinguish itself from the prosecutor’s office”).  Obviously, however, a
grand jury in the middle or latter part of its term would have a much better sense of the big
picture than would a neophyte grand jury.
245 See 1 BEALE ET AL., supra note 1, § 4:14. R
246 See, e.g., Andrew D. Leipold, Race-Based Jury Nullification: Rebuttal (Part A), 30 J. MAR-
SHALL L. REV. 923, 924 (1997) (arguing that “juries are incapable of making reasoned nulli-
fication decisions” because much of the necessary information is inadmissible at trial).
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dence.”247  The grand jury may subpoena any person to testify about
any subject and to produce any item.248  No hearsay restrictions limit
the evidence that the grand jury can hear.249  Furthermore, there are
very few constitutional barriers to a grand jury’s reception of evidence.
Unlike how it operates in the petit jury context, the exclusionary rule
does not suppress evidence to be submitted to the grand jury.250  Also,
although constitutional and some common law privileges are valid
against a grand jury subpoena for testimony and tangible evidence,
these can be (and often are) defeated by the provision of immunity to
the subpoenaed witness.251  Most importantly, although anecdotal evi-
dence compels the conclusion that the grand jury often passively re-
ceives the evidence that the prosecutor wants it to see,252 the grand
jury can use its tremendous subpoena power to seek any information
it desires—whether or not the prosecutor concurs.253  Potential access
to unlimited and unfiltered information certainly places the grand
jury in a unique position to exercise robust discretion.254
247 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 (1972).
248 See 1 BEALE ET AL., supra note 1, § 4:14 (2005 & Supp. 2007). R
249 See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956); see also Brenner, supra note
30, at 83–85 (describing divergent applications of evidentiary rules in federal and state R
grand juries).
250 See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349–52 (1974).  Furthermore, the Su-
preme Court has declined to extend to the grand jury subpoena context the relevancy,
specificity, and admissibility requirements associated with trial subpoenas. See United
States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 298–99 (1991).
251 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6003 (1994).
252 See, e.g., Brenner, supra note 30, at 99–100 (describing grand juries that act as the R
“passive collaborator of a prosecutor”).  Grand jury subpoenas are technically issued under
the auspices of the grand jury. See 1 BEALE ET AL., supra note 1, § 6:2.  However, prosecu- R
tors typically issue grand jury subpoenas to witnesses sua sponte without the input of the
grand jury. See Brenner, supra note 30, at 68 (“American grand jurors generally rely on a R
prosecutor to present evidence to them . . . .”).
253 See 1 BEALE ET AL., supra note 1, § 4:14.  The question remains how the grand jury is R
to learn that it has this broad subpoena power.  Also, one should note that the grand jury
has to rely on the contempt power of the judiciary to enforce its subpoenas, as the grand
jury has no independent means of compelling compliance. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(g).
254 See Brenner, supra note 30, at 83–86.  A seventeenth-century observer of the grand R
jury noted that it was much better situated than the petit jury to exercise discretion be-
cause of its ability to “send for persons, or Papers.” SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 70 (quoting R
JOHN SOMERS, THE SECURITY OF ENGLISH-MEN’S LIVES: OR THE TRUST, POWER AND DUTY OF
GRAND JURIES OF ENGLAND 86 (London, J. Almon 1761) (1681)).  Although no known study
examines how often self-initiated grand jury investigative requests occur, the process of
grand jury requests for additional evidence can be fairly informal and requests often are
simply routed through the prosecutor.  Occasionally, instances of grand jury investigative
initiative come to light despite the opacity of grand jury secrecy barriers; such motivated
grand juries often will draw the pejorative label “runaway grand jury.” See, e.g., Beall, supra
note 44, at 617. R
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4. Secrecy
Finally, the secrecy of the grand jury’s deliberations enhances the
quality of its decision making.  The Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure cloak the grand jury in complete secrecy; nonwitness participants
may not disclose any aspect of the grand jury’s work, including the
identity of the grand jurors and any “matter[s] occurring before the
grand jury.”255  This secrecy rule performs a number of functions by
preserving the integrity and confidentiality of criminal investigations
and protecting the identity, safety, and reputation of witnesses,
targets, and unindicted subjects.256  Secrecy also shields the grand
jury’s exercise of discretion from public glare, thereby minimizing the
possibility that grand jury members will feel compelled to base their
decisions on concerns about immediate public backlash in a given
case.257  Thus, secrecy can lead to greater reflection and richer, more
sincere deliberation.
Of course, grand jury secrecy also raises a number of problems.
Rules against disclosure of grand jury matters can frustrate the com-
municative function of the grand jury’s discretion.258  Messages that
the grand jury intended for various parts of the governmental struc-
ture might be lost in the web of secrecy regulations or not passed to
higher-ranking decision makers by the prosecutor.259
Furthermore, we have come to expect transparency and account-
ability in a free and democratic society.  The same secrecy that can
enhance the quality of deliberations also reduces accountability and
transparency—core values associated with legitimate discretionary
judgments.260  Certainly, it is fair to argue that grand jurors have no
accountability whatsoever because they are unelected and operate in
secret.  Furthermore, the secrecy of their deliberations runs counter
to our preference for transparency in the judgments of discretion-
255 FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2); PAUL S. DIAMOND, FEDERAL GRAND JURY PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 10.01(B) (4th ed. 2001).
256 See 1 BEALE ET AL., supra note 1, § 5:1; Daniel C. Richman, Grand Jury Secrecy: Plug- R
ging the Leaks in an Empty Bucket, 36 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 339, 352–53 (1999) (citing Douglas
Oil Co. v. Petrol Oil Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 219 n.10 (1979)).
257 See, e.g., United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1201 (9th Cir. 2005).  Of
course, grand jurors are often cognizant of strong public sentiment about the desirability
of a certain prosecution and may act accordingly.  However, were a grand jury to resist this
pressure, it would do so knowing that the identities of the grand jurors would remain
secret. See id.
258 See id. at 1201–02.
259 See id.
260 See, e.g., Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure, 81
N.Y.U. L. REV. 911, 916 (2006) (explaining how a lack of transparency “impairs outsiders’
faith in the law’s legitimacy and trustworthiness”); Mark Fenster, The Opacity of Trans-
parency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 910 (2006) (discussing the tensions between transparency
and secrecy in a democratic government).
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wielding actors.261  Despite our preference for transparency and ac-
countability, however, the grand jury was meant to operate in secrecy
and to be unaccountable—if not to the community,262 then certainly
to the governmental structure.263  Indeed, these features of the Ameri-
can grand jury were part of its original design.
Accountability concerns exist regarding other criminal justice ac-
tors with similar discretion.  Although the grand jury certainly does
not have the direct or indirect electoral accountability of other crimi-
nal justice actors,264 that electoral accountability is often fairly de-
tached—if it exists at all.  Law enforcement officers answer to publicly
accountable political appointees at the top of the organizational
chart, but the average law enforcement officer does not face such
pressure on a daily basis.265  Much of the same can be said with regard
to line prosecutors.266  Federal judges and some state judges enjoy life
tenure and, therefore, are not subject to electoral accountability at
261 See Fenster, supra note 260, at 910–11.  The cover of secrecy might empower a R
grand jury nullifying for so-called improper motives to do so without public scrutiny or
accountability.  The grand jury has certainly been a two-edged sword in this regard.  For
example, secrecy rules can enable jurors to act contrary to broader public opinion and
avoid decisions motivated by race prejudice, something that might be difficult for petit
jurors to do because their identities and decisions are exposed to the community. Cf.
O’BRIEN, supra note 49, at 185 & n.14 (noting swiftness of the grand jury proceedings and R
grand jurors’ isolation from the broader community during deliberation as central factors
to securing a rare indictment in a 1942 Mississippi lynching case).  Likewise, the grand
jury’s anonymity and unqualified power to decline to indict has created a situation ripe for
manipulation by those who would use the nullification power to protect those accused of
using murder and violence to oppress racial minorities. See United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d
167, 190 (5th Cir. 1965) (Wisdom, J., concurring specially); BLANCHE DAVIS BLANK, THE
NOT SO GRAND JURY 6 (1993) (“[M]embers of the Ku Klux Klan were often protected by
Southern grand juries against indictment under the Civil Rights Acts”); Brown, supra note
4, at 1171; Leipold, supra note 1, at 309. R
262 At certain times, grand jurors were chosen for service in ways that may have af-
fected the grand jury’s accountability.  Under one such method, the “key man” system,
individuals (mainly men) were specifically selected for service on the grand jury because of
their stature in the community. See ABRAMSON, supra note 241, at 99–100. The Jury Selec- R
tion and Service Act, passed by Congress in 1968, rendered the “key man” method illegal.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (2000).
263 See supra Part II.  Indeed, the Framers were likely familiar with the late seventeenth-
century English experience of judges fining and jailing grand juries with whose decisions
they did not agree. See SHAPIRO, supra note 14, at 55–56. R
264 See United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1183, 1203 (9th Cir. 2005) (observing
that executive, prosecutorial, and court-made determinations that certain laws are unwise
or unconstitutional are public and subject to review).
265 See Bibas, supra note 260, at 923 (explaining that “[m]uch of the criminal justice R
system is hidden from [the public’s] view” and noting that the public is unaware of many
of the decisions that law-enforcement officers make on a daily basis).
266 See, e.g., Navarro-Vargas, 367 F.3d at 902 (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (describing the
lack of electoral accountability for federal prosecutors).  Perhaps the policy pronounce-
ments from the Deputy Attorney General in the wake of the politically sensitive corporate
scandals of the late 1990s provide a counterexample. See, e.g., Memorandum from Larry D.
Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen., to the Heads of Dep’t Components, U.S. Attorneys
(Jan. 20, 2003), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate_guidelines.htm (set-
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all.267  Petit juries, of course, have no electoral accountability ei-
ther.268  And while executive policymaking in the criminal justice area
is theoretically subject to electoral accountability, concrete discretion-
ary judgments, such as late, final-term pardons, are often timed to
avoid such accountability.269  The grand jury, though not accountable
to the electorate in any concrete sense, is no less accountable than
many of the criminal justice actors who wield similar discretion.270
Furthermore, given the grand jury’s unique role, one can make a
colorable argument that its lack of electoral accountability is desira-
ble.  The grand jury’s independence from electoral politics might best
complement its role of checking the three branches of government
and providing cross-sectional feedback on the wisdom of criminal jus-
tice policy.  Recent scholarship has illuminated many impediments to
the political structure’s ability to pass effective and prudent crime-con-
trol measures—or to repeal bad ones.271  As it can in other areas, spe-
cial interest advocacy in criminal justice policymaking sometimes
diminishes the influence of voters.272  Perhaps the grand jury’s free-
dom from electoral accountability enhances its distinctive function of
helping to shape criminal justice policy with greater input from the
citizenry.
Although the grand jury’s secrecy renders its exercises of discre-
tion nontransparent, the discretion of other criminal justice actors
likewise lacks significant transparency.  The public is typically not
privy to law enforcement decisions whether to investigate, apprehend,
or refer an individual for charges.273  Sometimes law enforcement
maintains investigative notes and records that the public can conceiva-
ting forth a revised set of principles for prosecutors deciding whether to bring charges
against a business organization).
267 See ERWIN C. SURRENCY, HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL COURTS 390–91 (2002) (noting
that the Constitution gives federal judges life tenure); Michael W. Bowers, Public Financing
of Judicial Campaigns: Practices and Prospects, 4 NEV. L.J. 107, 107 (2003) (noting that Massa-
chusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island afford judges life tenure).
268 See GUINTHER, supra note 241, at xiii, 47 (explaining that a petit jury is composed of R
a group of “strangers” representing a cross section of the community and noting that the
members of a jury have “no continuing function” beyond returning a verdict).
269 See, e.g., Sisk, supra note 230, at 18. R
270 But see Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d at 1203 (arguing that prosecutors and courts are
accountable for their actions because they act transparently when determining that a law is
unwise or unconstitutional).
271 See, e.g., Symposium, Overcriminalization: the Politics of Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 541
(2005). But see Bonfield, supra note 175, at 390 (noting “reluctance among legislators to R
repeal existing enactments”); Brown, supra note 5, at 256–61 (noting that policymakers in R
the state systems, where the vast majority of American criminal law enforcement takes
place, are more democratically responsive than their counterparts in the federal system);
Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the “American Criminal Class”: Why Congress (Sometimes) Protects
the Rights of Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 613, 622–27 (2004).
272 See Brown, supra note 5, at 232–33. R
273 See supra section III.A.2.
\\server05\productn\C\CRN\93-4\CRN402.txt unknown Seq: 49 29-APR-08 10:27
2008] GRAND JURY DISCRETION 751
bly review through a Freedom of Information Act request274 or a liti-
gation discovery request.275  In most nonlitigation instances, however,
the discretionary judgments of law enforcement officials never receive
any public scrutiny.276  Similarly, prosecutors often make discretionary
judgments about whether and what to charge without disclosing their
rationale or, in cases where they decline to prosecute, their conclu-
sion.277  Although well-publicized cases exist as obvious exceptions,
prosecutors make the vast majority of their charging decisions without
any opportunity for public review.278
The public cannot force petit juries to discuss their deliberations,
and it is difficult to obtain information regarding jury deliberations
even where there exists suspicion of jury tampering or misconduct.279
Therefore, unless individual jurors voluntarily discuss their thought
processes, their collective exercise of discretion—aside from the ulti-
mate conclusion—is completely nontransparent.  Likewise, judges
who acquit defendants in bench trials or enter a judgment of acquittal
in jury trials may render their judgments without stating the reasons
underlying the decision, except for a reference to the governing stan-
dard of proof.280  Here again, although the evidence in the case is
obviously public, the decision to acquit (and thus forever shield from
criminal liability) a particular defendant is nontransparent.
Although executive criminal policymaking is potentially more
transparent than discretionary criminal investigations and prosecu-
tions, such policymaking often occurs behind closed doors.  While the
Executive may solicit public input and media coverage of the policy
discussion, the nature of the political process often shields com-
promises and concessions from public knowledge.281  Even in the case
274 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
275 FED. R. CIV. P. 26.
276 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 260, at 923. R
277 See id. at 912 (noting that prosecutors, along with others, “decid[e] which cases to
charge, which crimes and defendants should receive probation, and what prison sentences
are appropriate.  They reach many of these decisions in private negotiating rooms and
conference calls; in-court proceedings are mere formalities that confirm these decisions.”).
278 See id.
279 See FED. R. EVID. 606(b) (prohibiting juror testimony about jury deliberations or a
particular juror’s mental processes during deliberations).
280 See Fong Foo v. United States, 369 U.S. 141, 143 (1962) (holding that the Double
Jeopardy Clause bars retrial even if a trial judge’s “acquittal was based upon an egregiously
erroneous foundation”); Mannes v. Gillespie, 967 F.2d 1310, 1316 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
that the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial if a trial judge dismissed the charges against a
defendant because of “insufficient evidence”); United States v. Giampa, 758 F.2d 928, 929
(3d Cir. 1985) (holding that a court cannot review a lower court acquittal without violating
the Double Jeopardy Clause).
281 See Matthew Lynch, Closing the Orwellian Loophole: The Present Constitutionality of Big
Brother and the Potential for a First Amendment Cure, 5 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REV. 234, 271
(2007) (“Because the laws do not open all political transactions and communications to
the public eye, politicians may still make corrupt deals behind closed doors.”).
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of executive pardons, which typically receive much press coverage, the
public only knows that which the Executive discloses regarding the
process of deliberation and the justification for the ultimate decision.
Again, the lack of transparency that surrounds the grand jury’s
robust discretion is not remarkable when compared to other criminal
justice actors wielding significant discretion.  Moreover, given the
other safeguards and advantages associated with the grand jury, its se-
crecy may be less of a concern than the secrecy that shrouds other
exercises of discretion.  The grand jury’s discretion to decide on bases
beyond the sufficiency of the evidence does not differ in kind, or even
in degree, from the discretion of other criminal justice actors.  In ad-
dition, one can fairly argue that the grand jury is also better equipped
than other criminal justice actors—including the petit jury—to exer-
cise such robust discretion.  For example, grand jury deliberations
may be of higher quality because of the grand jury’s structure, access
to evidence, and secrecy.  Rather than bemoan the grand jury’s discre-
tion, we should acknowledge that its nature and unique role in our
constitutional structure position it to exercise the sort of robust discre-
tion that the criminal justice system freely extends to other actors.
IV
ENHANCING THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Even if the grand jury’s exercise of discretion on grounds beyond
sufficiency of the evidence neither subverts the rule of law nor allo-
cates to the grand jury undue discretion, the question remains
whether it is desirable from a normative standpoint.  For those who
are unconvinced that grand jury discretion is consistent with the rule
of law, the undermining influence the practice has on our commit-
ment to “government of laws, not persons” outweighs any of its poten-
tial benefits.282  However, even for those who are persuaded that the
grand jury’s robust discretion is legitimate, it is important to highlight
how the grand jury’s robust discretion may enhance the administra-
tion of justice.  Indeed, regardless of whether one approves of the
grand jury’s exercise of robust discretion, the unquestionable poten-
tial for its occurrence should prompt an examination of its positive
and negative consequences from the perspectives of various constitu-
encies in the criminal justice system.
A. Crime Control
Effective law enforcement is of paramount importance in a func-
tioning society.  At first blush, it would seem that grand jury discretion
necessarily hinders crime-control efforts.  When law enforcement in-
282 Hutchinson, supra note 64, at 196 (emphasis omitted). R
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vestigates a case and prosecutors seek to take it to trial and secure a
conviction, a grand jury’s refusal to indict can frustrate their efforts to
bring a perpetrator to justice.  While the grand jury’s filtering obvi-
ously will derail at least some cases that the prosecutor presents for
indictment, the grand jury’s refusal to indict may particularly disrupt
prosecutorial efforts when it bases its decision on grounds other than
sufficiency of the evidence.  Where a prosecutor presents sufficient
evidence to establish probable cause, a grand jury’s refusal to indict
clearly represents an obstacle to the prosecution and punishment of
criminal offenders.283  Assuming that the grand jury’s nature, role,
and its discretionary power will sometimes frustrate the government’s
capacity to control crime, it might be useful to look to the other side
of the ledger—how might such discretion enhance the administration
of criminal justice from a crime-control perspective?  How might pros-
ecutors harness the grand jury’s discretionary power as an asset to ef-
fective law enforcement?
The ability of the grand jury to exercise its robust discretion
might actually strengthen cases against criminal defendants.  A grand
jury may filter out cases that meet the bare probable cause threshold
but lack real jury appeal.  Of course, prosecutors will sometimes de-
cide to dismiss a case postindictment, either because flaws in the evi-
dence have developed or other issues have revealed weaknesses in the
case.  However, if prosecutors become immersed in a case’s details,
particularly where the facts strongly indicate a defendant’s guilt,284
then prosecutors may not see these all-important flaws and weaknesses
in the same way that the grand jury members might.  Such insights
from the grand jury may spill over to nonevidentiary considerations
that would draw the attention of a petit jury later in the process.
Thus, the grand jury can assist the government by counseling the
prosecutor to change course in a flawed case—either by dismissing
the case outright or revising the charges—before the case ever
reaches trial.285  Regardless of one’s views on nullification, grand jury
283 See supra subpart I.B.
284 Although some might argue that one can never be completely certain of a defen-
dant’s guilt, a prosecutor’s estimation of a defendant’s guilt may be stronger than that of a
petit jury because of the prosecutor’s other evidence.  For example, a prosecutor may know
of unconstitutionally obtained evidence or plea proffers that are inaccessible to the petit
jurors.
285 See United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184, 1193–95 (9th Cir. 2005) (dis-
cussing the traditional “screening function of the grand jury”).  It should be noted that, in
certain cases, the prosecutor may welcome a grand jury’s exercise of discretion, see, e.g.,
HOWARD W. GOLDSTEIN, GRAND JURY PRACTICE § 4.02[2], at 4-9 (2007), particularly where
action by the grand jury insulates the prosecutor from political pressure in favor of, or in
opposition to, a potential prosecution. Cf., e.g., Bob Kemper, Grand Jury Refuses to Indict
McKinney, ATLANTA J.-CONST., June 17, 2006, at A1; McKinney Won’t Be Indicted in March
Incident with Capitol Police, Grand Jury Decides, CONG. Q. WKLY., June 19, 2006, at 1721.
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nullification would seem to be preferable to petit jury nullification
after a full trial because early nullification prevents the waste of tre-
mendous and precious resources.286
Aside from filtering cases or individual counts that are less likely
to result in conviction at trial, the grand jury’s exercise of robust dis-
cretion can strengthen the government’s already formidable bargain-
ing position in postindictment plea negotiations.  Where there is a
general perception that the grand jury passively approves indictments
upon receipt of a bare minimum of proof, the grand jury’s indictment
does not significantly enhance the government’s bargaining position;
if a grand jury will “indict a ham sandwich,”287 the indictment says
little, if anything, about the strength of the government’s case.288  If,
however, it were common knowledge that the grand jury not only pos-
sessed robust discretion but also exercised it when appropriate, the
prosecutor could point to an indictment as a strong affirmation of the
government’s case and as a significant indicator that a petit jury will
be less likely to acquit so long as the prosecution meets its evidentiary
burden.
Also, a putative defendant may be more willing to waive the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and testify before the
grand jury when that client knows of the grand jury investigation and
the grand jury is aware of its robust discretion and willing to exercise
it in appropriate cases.289  Although this allows the defendant to at-
286 See United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 367 F.3d 896, 900, 902–03 (9th Cir. 2004)
(Kozinski, J., dissenting), vacated en banc, 382 F.3d 920 (9th Cir. 2004) (arguing that the
grand jury is a check on prosecutorial discretion and “may consider the wisdom of the law
in deciding whether to indict”).  Grand jury discretion might actually serve to reduce the
amount of petit jury nullification in the system.  Where grand juries are cognizant of their
robust discretion and, more importantly, citizens are familiar with and endorse the legiti-
macy of such discretion, so-called nullification might actually occur at the grand jury stage
rather than the petit jury stage.  Recognition of the grand jury’s unique role and robust
discretion may have the impact of ensuring greater fidelity by petit juries to deciding cases
based solely on the evidence.  Under this view, the grand jury would be the forum for
considerations such as the wisdom of a law, justice ideals, or the redeeming qualities of a
defendant; once the grand jury declines to derail the prosecution on such grounds, the
petit jury’s function is simply to test the sufficiency of the evidence and to convict a defen-
dant if the government carries its burden of proof. See Robinson, supra note 191, at 403 R
(“Studies on jury nullification indicate that jurors frequently exercise their nullification
power to circumvent specific rules when they believe that applying them would conflict
with broad normative notions of justice.”).
287 David Margolick, Law Professor to Administer Courts in State: Appointed by Wachtler to
Supervise System, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1985, at B2 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Chief Judge Sol Wachtler of the New York Court of Appeals).
288 Of course, indictment itself adversely impacts the defendant.  Indictment may di-
minish a defendant’s bargaining power in the criminal justice system and levy a reputa-
tional, social, economic, and psychological toll upon an accused.
289 See Simmons, supra note 3, at 24 (stating that testimony of the potential defendant R
before the grand jury “makes sense if the grand jury is actually performing a broader, more
political role”).  If a defendant has been charged with a felony prior to grand jury indict-
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tempt to influence that grand jury to make a decision on bases other
than the sufficiency of the evidence, many prosecutors would likely
take that risk in exchange for the chance to question a defendant
before the grand jury.290  Prosecutors regularly send “target” letters to
potential defendants, informing them that the grand jury investiga-
tions are concluding and inviting them to testify before the grand
jury.291  Potential defendants rarely accept these invitations,292 no
doubt because acceptance would require waiving the privilege against
self-incrimination,293 because defense counsel generally cannot be
present in the grand jury room, and because evidentiary restrictions
do not limit the questions that a prosecutor can ask a witness before a
grand jury.294  The (perhaps overly optimistic) hope that the benefits
of persuading the grand jury to exercise its robust discretion will out-
weigh the dangers of testifying might prompt more defendants to ac-
cept their invitations to testify.295
Finally, grand jury discretion may enhance community involve-
ment and positively impact law enforcement strategies.  The active,
robust participation of grand juries in shaping enforcement priorities
helps to foster community buy-in—a phenomenon that can enhance
overall crime-control efforts.296  Community participation via the
grand jury can create and nurture incentives for community members
ment and arrested or summonsed, a defendant is obviously on notice that grand jury ac-
tion is forthcoming.  Even in cases in which the grand jury investigation precedes any
contact with the target, a target may be placed on notice because witnesses are not bound
by the same strict secrecy rules that cover almost all other aspects of a grand jury investiga-
tion. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e).  As a result, defendants will often become aware of a grand
jury investigation through a confederate who has been subpoenaed to testify before the
grand jury.
290 See Simmons, supra note 3, at 38 (explaining that prosecutors benefit from disclo- R
sure of the defendant’s theory of the case so early on in the process).
291 See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 173, § 9-11.153. R
292 See Simmons, supra note 3, at 37 & n.173. R
293 See id. at 37–38 (noting that a prosecutor may later use anything a defendant said in
the grand jury proceeding).
294 See U.S. ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, supra note 173, § 9-11.152. R
295 See Simmons, supra note 3, at 23–25.  Recent trends indicate that in systems in R
which a defendant has the right to make a presentation to the grand jury, more grand jury
targets take the opportunity to attempt to persuade the grand jury to reject charges. See,
e.g., William Glaberson, New Trend Before Grand Juries: Meet the Accused, N.Y. TIMES, June 20,
2004, at N1.  The absence of a double jeopardy rule in federal grand jury practice, how-
ever, makes a defendant’s testimony before a federal grand jury dangerous.  Even if one
grand jury refuses to indict, the government could seek an indictment from a second
grand jury and use any of a defendant’s potentially incriminating statements from the de-
fendant’s earlier grand jury testimony.
296 Cf. Dan M. Kahan, Reciprocity, Collective Action, and Community Policing, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 1513, 1538–39 (2002) (arguing that reciprocity and the promotion of trust, rather
than traditional deterrence-based punishment, secure “socially desirable behavior”); Tra-
cey L. Meares, Praying for Community Policing, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1593, 1595–96 (2002) (ex-
plaining that although critics of community policing contend that the alignment of police
and community interests may compromise individual criminal rights, this alignment may
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to work with law enforcement to develop crime-prevention and crime-
control initiatives in their communities.297  Indeed, the integration of
the community in enforcement design perhaps portends a more di-
rect and tangible crime-control benefit than the aforementioned fea-
tures of robust grand jury discretion.
B. Efficiency
From an efficiency standpoint, the grand jury’s robust discretion
may offer some benefits.  Whatever one thinks about the merits of
petit jury nullification, its costs in wasted time and court resources are
immense.298  A trial requires the government to devote one or more
of its attorneys for an often-intense period of trial preparation.299
This preparatory period is then followed by the trial itself, which can
range from hours to months.  Given the caseloads of many prosecu-
tors, a trial that results in petit jury nullification represents a tremen-
dous waste of time and energy.300  Witnesses, both government and
civilian, must expend time, miss work or leisure commitments, and
travel sometimes great distances to the place of trial.  The court itself
transfers scarce resources to the trial of a matter, from blocks of time
on the judge’s calendar to court security personnel assigned to the
courtroom.
For these reasons, it would seem that a case that will ultimately
result in nullification is better nullified at the grand jury stage than at
the petit jury stage.  Of course, there is no guarantee that a petit jury
would inevitably nullify a case that a grand jury deems appropriate for
nullification.  Although both grand and petit juries are drawn from
the same pool,301 their ultimate members will consist of different indi-
viduals with different perspectives and, as was discussed above, the
petit jury likely will be exposed to a narrower slice of the available
also enable residents to “hold law enforcers accountable in order to better guide their
exercise of discretion”).
297 Cf. Kahan, supra note 296, at 1538–39 (concluding that fostering trust and recipro- R
cal cooperation between the citizenry and police officers more effectively controls crime
than standard policing methods do alone).
298 Cf. Edward Brunet, A Study in the Allocation of Scarce Judicial Resources: The Efficiency of
Federal Intervention Criteria, 12 GA. L. REV. 701, 710 (1978) (asserting that increasingly im-
portant efficiency goals often lead to less accurate decision making).
299 Of course, in busy jurisdictions, it is not unheard of for a prosecutor to be assigned
to try the case in the courtroom as the judge is taking the bench.  Although these trials
obviously do not receive the same amount of preparation as others, witness and court-
personnel time are still a considerable cost.
300 See F. Andrew Hessick, III & Reshma M. Saujani, Plea Bargaining and Convicting the
Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense, and the Judge, 16 BYU J. PUB. L. 189, 193 (2002)
(asserting that jury nullification indicates that “the prosecutor has misallocated his re-
sources and time in deciding to prosecute the case”).
301 See Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 § 101, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1968).
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information.302  For those cases where a grand jury and a petit jury are
likely to respond similarly to presented evidence, however, earlier dis-
position can help to avoid wasting time and resources.
Another efficiency benefit of the grand jury’s robust discretion is
that it may increase early pleas or dispositions of criminal cases.303
Because the grand jury has such broad entitlement and access to in-
formation, it is in a key position to illuminate for the government cer-
tain paths to conclusion that may not be readily apparent.  A grand
juror who has become fully informed through questioning key wit-
nesses and reviewing information received in the grand jury might
suggest to the prosecutor an alternate set of charges or civil settlement
that a defendant might find amenable while still imposing the appro-
priate amount of societal condemnation.304  In this way, the grand
jury can function almost as a sounding board for prosecutors or an
alternative dispute resolution tool in certain criminal cases.  Where
the grand jury prompts alternate sanctions and means of restitution or
guides the prosecutor’s plea bargaining strategy, the grand jury, in its
exercise of robust discretion, enhances the efficiency of the criminal
justice process by facilitating pretrial disposition of criminal cases.
Finally, the grand jury’s robust discretion may calibrate the dis-
cretion of other criminal justice actors, leading to more careful and
deliberative decision making elsewhere in the system.  Because the
grand jury is the choke point in the stream of cases flowing from the
investigative stage to the prosecution stage,305 the grand jury is
uniquely situated to review and shape the otherwise unchecked discre-
tion of other actors in the criminal justice system.  For example, a
prosecutor might tire of receiving disorderly conduct cases from the
local police for charging and papering.  Believing the cases to involve
minimal criminal conduct and to be an inefficient use of
prosecutorial resources, the prosecutor may simply tell the police de-
partment that he or she will no longer pursue those types of cases—
regardless of the amount of evidence that supports the defendant’s
guilt.  Although the police may not agree with the prosecutor’s posi-
tion, they will most likely alter their enforcement priorities and may
better exercise discretion regarding the individuals whom they arrest
302 See supra section III.B.3.  Conceivably, a petit jury could actually be exposed to more
information than a grand jury because of the development of additional evidence during
the postindictment investigation or because the prosecutor will hold back—and the grand
jury may fail to request—the full portfolio of available inculpatory evidence at the time of
indictment.
303 Of course, one may fairly argue that a public trial of the accused serves socially
useful ends, even if petit jury nullification is likely to occur.
304 See Kuckes, supra note 7, at 1317 (concluding that recognizing the grand jury’s R
function as a “democratic prosecutor” creates room for community values to influence
prosecutorial charging decisions).
305 See supra subpart I.A.
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for disorderly conduct.  Similarly, a grand jury’s exercise of its discre-
tion can create ripple effects on the exercises of discretion of other
criminal justice actors, thus increasing the overall efficiency of the
criminal justice process.
C. The Grand Jury and Individual Rights
The ability to exercise discretion also benefits the grand jury itself
and, by extension, enhances the protection of individual rights.  While
the reporters and scholarly pages are replete with references to the
grand jury as a shield between the power of the government and the
liberty of the individual,306 many nevertheless perceive the grand jury
as having strayed from its moorings as an active and vigilant protector
of individual rights.307  However, the grand jury’s robust discretion
can cut against this notion and serve as the basis for a more vigorous
institution that performs its protective function and adds value to the
administration of criminal justice.  Recognition of the grand jury’s dis-
cretion may very well strengthen the grand jury as an institution, and a
fortified grand jury may enhance the individual liberties it serves to
protect.
This enhancement begins with the grand jurors themselves—they
must recognize their own robust discretion.  Presumably, if the grand
jury exercises this discretion, grand jurors would take greater owner-
ship of their investigations and demand answers to questions regard-
ing the merits of individual cases.  This mode of behavior runs
contrary to the common view of the grand jury as passively receiving
hearsay evidence that the government packages and presents for un-
critical consumption and acceptance.308  In this way, the grand jury’s
discretion enhances citizen participation in the criminal justice sys-
tem—participation that the system sorely lacks in this age of ubiqui-
tous guilty pleas.309  The grand jury’s robust discretion allows for
direct community guidance of law enforcement and prosecutorial re-
306 See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974) (“[T]he Founders
thought the grand jury so essential to basic liberties that they provided in the Fifth Amend-
ment that federal prosecution for serious crimes can only be instituted by a presentment or
indictment of a Grand Jury.” (internal citations and quotations omitted)); Ex parte Bain,
121 U.S. 1, 12 (1887), overruled by United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002); [pt. 3 vol.
1] BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 84
(1968); SURRENCY, supra note 267. R
307 See, e.g., Kuckes, supra note 1, at 1–2; Leipold, supra note 1, at 286–88. R
308 See Leipold, supra note 1, at 263 (“The grand jury is frequently criticized for failing R
to act as a meaningful check on the prosecutor’s charging decisions; according to the
cliche´s it is a ‘rubber stamp,’ perfectly willing to ‘indict a ham sandwich’ if asked to do so
by the government.” (citations omitted)); see also Peter J. Henning, Prosecutorial Misconduct
in Grand Jury Investigations, 51 S.C. L. REV. 1, 4–6 (1999) (considering critiques of the grand
jury’s lack of independence from the prosecutor).
309 See Bibas, supra note 260, at 912; Kuckes, supra note 7, at 1307–08; Adriaan Lanni, R
The Future of Community Justice, 40 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 359, 369–70 (2005) (discussing
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source allocation as well as feedback on criminal legislation.  As citi-
zens take greater ownership in the grand jury, they strengthen the
institution.
In turn, greater engagement of grand jurors enhances the bene-
fits that accused individuals enjoy from the grand jury’s protective
function.  Certainly, where the grand jury exercises its discretion on
bases beyond mere sufficiency of the evidence, it expands the inquiry
beyond whether a case may proceed to trial to whether it should pro-
ceed to trial.310  Whether or not one agrees with its appropriateness,
this expanded view provides greater protection to criminal defendants
than does the bare sufficiency of the evidence view.  Furthermore,
central to the protective function is the idea that the grand jury will
ensure that prosecutors do not pursue meritless charges, given the
tremendous economic, psychological, social, and reputational costs
that accompany a trial.  In cases where the petit jury or trial judge
likely would have eventually acquitted on grounds other than the suffi-
ciency of the evidence or a sentencing judge likely would have spared
the defendant any serious punishment,311 the grand jury’s exercise of
discretion spares defendants the ordeal of trial, public shame, and
reputational damage.
The grand jury’s robust discretion also highlights the value of the
grand jury in an era when many believe that it serves no real function.
Some argue that the modern grand jury’s probable cause determina-
tion function is unnecessary and redundant.312  In the federal system,
for example, a judicial officer will make a probable cause determina-
tion that supports the arrest warrant or summons of the defendant.313
Most defendants then will have probable cause determined by a judi-
cial officer—a magistrate or district judge—at a preliminary examina-
tion, during which defense counsel may cross-examine the
government’s witnesses.314  The typical felony case will require that a
grand jury determine the existence of probable cause—a prerequisite
to an indictment.315  Although the grand jury can disagree with these
earlier judicial probable cause determinations and decline to indict,
“community prosecution” that “permit[s] local citizens to influence law enforcement and
charging decisions traditionally left to the prosecutor’s discretion”).
310 See supra subpart I.B.
311 Of course, whether a petit jury or judge would have done such a thing in a given
case is a matter of conjecture.
312 See, e.g., Margolick, supra note 287, at B2. R
313 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 4.
314 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1.
315 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(f); ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra note 8, at 3 R
(noting that “[i]f the grand jury finds probable cause to exist, then it will return a written
statement of the charges called an ‘indictment’”).
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its approval of an indictment is dispositive on the question of proba-
ble cause for all other purposes.316
Because other actors also determine probable cause,317 some see
the grand jury as a “superfluous” vestige of an era before the develop-
ment of a professional police force and court system to ensure pretrial
screening of charges for merit.318  Others argue that lay grand jurors
are ill-equipped to balance the complex considerations inherent in
determining whether evidence reaches the legal threshold of proba-
ble cause.319  Judicial officers, the argument goes, can better recog-
nize when the legal definition of probable cause is satisfied and
therefore are more effective.320
This view is problematic for a few reasons.  First, the fact that
both judicial officers and grand juries can determine the existence of
probable cause does not mean they are performing overlapping
roles.321  Historical evidence shows that evidentiary standards have
shifted over time, and the probable cause on which the grand jury
currently operates does not indicate that the grand jury was to per-
form the same function as judicial officers.322  Also, the fact that grand
jury indictment is required, even though the Constitution guarantees
a probable cause determination for arrested individuals, indicates that
the grand jury plays an additional role in the justice system.  Finally,
from a more practical standpoint, an indictment often will allege
charges that the initial complaint did not, meaning that the judicial
officer who presided over the preliminary hearing did not review such
charges for probable cause.  Thus, the grand jury alone reviews those
allegations for probable cause.
However, apart from one’s opinion on the issue of the grand
jury’s role in determining probable cause, the grand jury’s robust dis-
cretion to consider bases beyond the sufficiency of the evidence coun-
ters the claim of redundancy and inadequacy.  The grand jury, sitting
as a body of the accused’s peers and representing the voice of the
community, is uniquely positioned to exercise such discretion.  Some
316 For example, a grand jury indictment before arrest obviates the need for a proba-
ble cause determination related to the complaint, and a grand jury indictment returned
before a preliminary examination obviates the need for a probable cause determination at
that stage. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a)(2), 9(a); see also Kuckes, supra note 7, at 1281–82 R
(noting that courts view preliminary hearings following grand jury indictment as
duplicative).
317 It remains important to note that new charges may develop by the time a case
reaches the indictment stage.  As a result, the grand jury often passes upon counts that
judicial officers have not reviewed.
318 See EDWARDS, supra note 87, at 35. R
319 See Leipold, supra note 1, at 294–304. R
320 See id.
321 See Kuckes, supra note 7, at 1294–99. R
322 See supra subpart II.B.
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argue that the grand jury’s power to nullify represents the only “mean-
ingful screening function”323 that it performs.  Even if we assume that
grand juries are deficient in screening cases on grounds associated
with the sufficiency of the evidence, the argument stands.  By exercis-
ing discretion, the grand jury adds value to the indictment process
and distinguishes itself from judicial officers tasked with making bare
probable cause determinations.
Regardless of whether one believes that the grand jury is of di-
minished value and utility, the grand jury’s discretion potentially can
energize and engage grand jurors, enhance the grand jury’s protec-
tive function, and provide a greater role for ordinary citizens in the
criminal justice process.  In this way, the grand jury’s discretion also
demonstrates its added value to the administration of criminal justice.
Assuming that the grand jury’s nullification power is consistent
with the rule of law and enhances the administration of criminal jus-
tice, a question remains: how should grand jurors be informed of
their discretion?  One method might be civic education, either under
the auspices of the government or through private organizations.  Of
course, the most direct method would involve informing the grand
jurors of their discretion when they are empanelled and sworn at the
beginning of their terms of service.  An empanelling judge will typi-
cally charge the grand jurors that if they find probable cause in a case,
they should indict.324  A simple shift to language informing grand ju-
rors that they may indict if they find probable cause would enhance
the grand jury’s discretionary role.325  Furthermore, along with the
discretion instruction, grand jurors would need a reminder of their
own investigative prerogative and the limits on the role of the prose-
cutor in the grand jury.
Once the grand jury is fully equipped with knowledge of its role
and power, the aforementioned benefits of robust grand jury discre-
tion may be realized.  Such realization would restore the grand jury as
an engine of criminal justice, rather than merely a vehicle.
323 Leipold, supra note 1, at 307. R
324 See Model Grand Jury Charge, supra note 7 (“The purpose of the Grand Jury is to R
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify a formal accusation against a per-
son—that is, to determine if there is ‘probable cause’ to believe the person committed a
crime. . . .  [Y]ou should vote to indict where the evidence presented to you is sufficiently
strong to warrant a reasonable person’s belief that the person being investigated is proba-
bly guilty of the offense charged.”).
325 Cf. KALVEN, supra note 11, at 498 (1966) (“Perhaps one reason why the [petit] jury R
exercises its very real power [to deviate from the judge] so sparingly is because it is offi-
cially told it has none.”); Brody, supra note 10, at 91–93.  However, it remains to be seen R
whether resistance—on both policy and constitutional grounds—to the notion that grand
juries should exercise discretion on bases beyond sufficiency of the evidence will prevent
such instructions from being implemented voluntarily or deemed mandatory under the
Fifth Amendment’s Grand Jury Clause. See United States v. Navarro-Vargas, 408 F.3d 1184,
1210–11 (9th Cir. 2005) (Hawkins, J., dissenting); supra note 118. R
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CONCLUSION
One prominent scholar has queried “whether the [grand jury’s]
power to nullify is consistent with the constitutional command, and
whether it is a desirable part of a rational criminal justice system.”326
This Article answers both questions affirmatively.  The grand jury, by
design, serves a structural role in our constitutional system as a check
on the three branches of government and moderator of criminal law
federalism.  Given its characteristics, the grand jury is uniquely
equipped to serve as a conduit for communication between the peo-
ple and the governmental structure, as well as between the national
government and local communities, on issues of criminal justice pol-
icy.  The grand jury’s robust discretion—its ability to determine the
propriety of indictments on bases beyond sufficiency of the evi-
dence—enhances this communicative function.
Furthermore, the grand jury’s discretion can and does operate as
part of a rational system of criminal justice.  The discretion implicit in
the nullification power is appropriately lodged in the grand jury—a
body better equipped for it than other discretion-wielding actors
within the criminal justice system.  Additionally, and perhaps more
importantly, the availability of this discretion can positively impact the
administration of criminal justice from efficiency and crime-control
perspectives.  At the same time, the grand jury’s ability to exercise its
discretion can enhance individual rights, our participatory democ-
racy, and the institution of the grand jury itself.
To be sure, grand jury discretion also poses significant difficul-
ties.  The rule of law critique and discretion-allocation issues aside, a
number of questions are left unanswered.  One question asks whether
grand jury nullification actually fulfills its claimed structural and com-
municative role when double jeopardy protections do not prevent
prosecutors from empanelling another grand jury that may be more
willing to indict.  Also, as discussed above, the concerns presented by
the grand jury’s discretionary power—such as the lack of transparency
and accountability, potential for oppression of disfavored groups, and
frustration of law enforcement—are important and should not be cast
aside.
Nevertheless, the grand jury’s discretionary power, properly
viewed, is consistent with the rule of law, prudent allocation of discre-
tion, and efficient and wise administration of criminal justice.  This
recognition is a necessary first step to unlocking the nature and role
of the grand jury in our constitutional democracy and criminal justice
system.  Rather than reflexively condemning the grand jury’s discre-
tion, we should acknowledge how it allows the grand jury to play its
326 Leipold, supra note 1, at 310. R
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intended and important function in our constitutional design.  In
fact, the grand jury’s ability to exercise robust discretion may reveal its
full necessity and value.
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